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I must confess that I never imagined my Ph.D. journey to be so rugged and, at 
the same time, so gratifying. It was rugged because of many academic and 
non-academic obstacles I had to overcome and many sacrifices I had to make. 
It was gratifying for two reasons: First, I enjoyed my field of study. Second, I 
met many wonderful individuals whose friendships I will cherish for long. To 
acknowledge these individuals is to tell the story of my journey. 
The journey started when I met a man of exceptional qualities, 
Professor Kulwant Singh, who later became my PhD advisor. While an 
accomplished academic and educator, his modesty and compassion struck me 
the most. Since then, my every encounter with him confirmed that 
observation. He is not just an advisor to me, but also a role model of what it 
takes to be an academic and a responsible educator. His high standard for 
research, unwavering academic integrity, and ability to explain very intricate 
ideas in simple terms are accompanied by a pleasant character. I cannot put 
into words how much he cared about my success. 
Professor Singh patiently listened to my very underdeveloped ideas, 
never scorned them, but gently helped me refine them into viable research 
questions. Every meeting with him was encouraging and constructive. He 
cared about every detail, read the manuscripts many times and even walked 
me through the very basics of academic writing, research development, 
empirical examination, and manuscript crafting. He did all this with utmost 
patience. 
At some point, the journey became very rough. That was when another 
wonderful individual joined Professor Singh to guide me through this journey. 
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humanitarian and a forerunner of community development, social 
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This journey became even more gratifying when another exceptional 
academic accepted my request to be my co-advisor. Having trained Kulwant 
Singh and many other noble researchers, Professor Will Mitchell kindly 
accepted me as his student. This was the pinnacle of this journey and made 
every obstacle worth it. He was instrumental in every step of my thesis 
development.  
Working with Professor Mitchell influenced my way of looking at 
academic research and formulation of research ideas. He spent long hours 
listening to my ideas, commenting on the empirical models, and providing me 
with invaluable insight into the global health-care industry. His support helped 
me believe in the potential of my research. But, perhaps, the most valuable 
academic lesson I learnt from him was how important it is to remain focused 
in research. His influence, however, goes beyond research. He has set a 
standard for morale, compassion and modesty that not many can live up to. 
Throughout this journey, with all its ups and downs, I was fortunate to 
have a mentor and a good friend, Professor Ishtiaq Pasha Mahmood. Pasha is 
known for his quality research, intellectualism, and being a larger-than-life 
character. I enjoyed our thought-provoking conversations whose topics ranged 
from strategic management, economics, philosophy of science, history, 
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sociology, to food, fashion and life-style. If I needed to talk to someone, he 
would kindly listen to me venting and sharing my concerns over a nice meal or 
snack.  
In many ways, I am indebted to Professor Daniel McAllister. He has 
been supporting me throughout this journey with his invaluable advice. Also, I 
should acknowledge Professor Michael Frese’s encouragement and guidance. 
Likewise, Professor Richard Arvey, the Head of the Department of 
Management and Organization, created a conducive and friendly environment 
for research. 
I should also acknowledge the moral support I received from my 
classmates and friends. Particularly, Poornima’s encouragement and help 
made a difference during my PhD. Working with her on several research ideas 
helped me develop important research skills. Zhiying Jiang’s (Masia) 
friendship and help made this long and uneven journey easier. Hossein with 
his fine taste and passion for everything à la dolce vita was certainly necessary 
for a better PhD experience. I should also acknowledge the friendship of Dr. 
Avvari Mohan. Since I left my homeland and settled in South East Asia, he 
and his lovely family helped me feel at home. 
 I was fortunate to be in the NUS Business School while Ms. Lim 
Cheow Loo was in charge of the school’s PhD program. Cheow Loo 
epitomizes Singaporean patience, diligence, and excellence. Under her 
leadership the PhD students can concentrate on their studies while she resolves 
very complicated matters without letting them feel any pressure. Similarly, 
Professor Trichy Krishnan has been very supportive; and, helped me 
accomplish this journey. 
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 My Sister and my brother-in-law were my source of comfort. I doubt if 
I could accomplish my PhD without their unconditional love and support. My 
brother kept our house cheerful and took care of my parents so that I can study 
with peace of mind. His growth into a successful, young man was a source of 
joy to our family. 
 And last, but not the least; my parents made many sacrifices for my 
success and happiness. They have dedicated their entire life to helping me 
viii 
 
realize my dreams. My mother, the beating heart of our family, has always 
been my best advisor and teacher. My father, the beacon of knowledge and 
wisdom, inculcated in me the zeal for knowledge and research. For their love 
























TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... iv 
SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................. xv 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. xv 
CHAPTER 1 ......................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
Essay 1 ............................................................................................................. 2 
Motivation and Contributions ......................................................................... 3 
Findings ....................................................................................................... 7 
Essay 2 ........................................................................................................... 10 
Motivation and Contributions ....................................................................... 12 
Findings ..................................................................................................... 14 
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................... 16 
ESSAY 1: ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO RECONFIGURATION FOLLOWING A 
TECHNOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY .............................................................. 16 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 16 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ...................................................................... 19 
Alliance Portfolios ...................................................................................... 19 
Technological Discontinuities ...................................................................... 21 
Alliances for Challenged Resources .............................................................. 23 
Alliances for Reinforced Resources .............................................................. 25 
Alliances for New Resources ....................................................................... 27 
Interaction of Alliances ................................................................................ 29 
METHODS .................................................................................................... 30 
Empirical Setting ........................................................................................ 30 
Data ........................................................................................................... 33 
Measurement .............................................................................................. 35 
Analyses ..................................................................................................... 42 
RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 44 
Robustness Tests ......................................................................................... 64 
x 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................. 65 
CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................... 73 
ESSAY 2: STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO 
RECONFIGURATION FOLLOWING A TECHNOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY 73 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 73 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ...................................................................... 77 
Interdependence of the Focal Firm and its Alliance Portfolio .......................... 79 
Technological Diversity of the Alliance Portfolio .......................................... 84 
Interaction of Technological Diversity and Interdependence........................... 86 
METHODS .................................................................................................... 87 
Empirical Setting ............................................................................................ 87 
Data ........................................................................................................... 89 
Measurement .............................................................................................. 90 
Analyses ................................................................................................... 104 
RESULTS .................................................................................................... 105 
Robustness Test ........................................................................................ 109 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................... 110 
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................... 115 
DICUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................... 115 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 115 
CONTRIBUTIONS ...................................................................................... 116 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ............................................. 120 












An effective alliance portfolio comprises a stable set of direct alliances that 
allows firms to obtain resources from partners at lower total cost than through 
market exchange or internal development. In this thesis, I study how firms 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios following a technological discontinuity. A 
technological discontinuity is a “technical advance so significant that no 
increase in scale, efficiency, or design can make older technologies 
competitive with the new technology” (Tushman and Anderson 1986, p. 441).I 
ask two research questions and address them in two interrelated essays: 1) 
How a technological discontinuity that alters the value of different types of 
resources causes firms to reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming new 
alliances to access required resources and by disbanding current alliances that 
provide redundant resources, and  2) how reconfiguration of alliance portfolios 
is shaped by their structural properties. 
 I address these questions in a study of alliance portfolios in a 
longitudinal sample of 331 firms in the global biopharmaceutical industry 
between 1990 and 2000. This period experienced a technological discontinuity 
in the form of the emergence of combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening in 1995. This discontinuity radically altered the drug development 
process, and the value of resources used in this process. 
With respect to the question addressed in Essay 1, I found that firms 
responded to the technological discontinuity through formation and 
disbandment of alliances for different types of resources. The analysis showed 
that firms are more likely to form and disband alliances for resources whose 
value is challenged by the discontinuity. Also, they are more likely to form 
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more alliances for new resources and the resources whose value is reinforced 
by the discontinuity. And, contrary to my initial expectations, firms disbanded 
more alliances for resources reinforced by the discontinuity. Furthermore, 
formation of new alliances increased the likelihood of disbandment of current 
alliances. Hence the discontinuity affected the levels of new alliance formation 
and disbandment of current alliances, depending on the nature of impact on 
firms’ resources.  
The findings of this essay show that exogenous shocks-- in the form of 
technological discontinuities-- play an important role in the evolution of 
alliance portfolios. Also, the results show that changes in alliance ties within a 
portfolio are related, confirming that alliance portfolios have collective 
properties. 
In addressing the second question in Essay 2, I found that two key 
structural properties of alliance portfolios condition their reconfiguration 
following the discontinuity. First, interdependence of a focal firm with its 
alliance portfolio partners before the discontinuity hinders reconfiguration 
following the discontinuity.   A firm is interdependent with its portfolio 
partners when control over the necessary conditions for the achievement of the 
outcomes desired from the portfolio is shared between the firm and its alliance 
portfolio partners. 
 Second, I found that alliance portfolios’ technological diversity before 
the discontinuity increases their reconfiguration following the discontinuity. 
Technological diversity of an alliance portfolio refers to the degree to which 
alliance ties in the portfolio transfer diverse technological resources between 
the firm and its partners. Furthermore, the two structural properties interact to 
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shape the reconfiguration of alliance portfolios following the discontinuity. 
The greatest reconfiguration is observed among the portfolios with the least 
interdependence and the greatest technological diversity. 
These results show that structural properties of alliances portfolios 
work in tandem with technological discontinuities to shape their evolution. 
Therefore, variation in firms’ reconfiguration of their alliance portfolios in 
response to technological discontinuities is partially explained by the structure 
of their portfolios. 
In addressing the reconfiguration of alliance portfolios, my thesis 
provides new insights into the evolutionary processes of portfolios and shows 
that firms actively manage their alliance portfolios. The results underpin the 
value of studying alliances in a portfolio form. 
The evaluation of the impact of the technological discontinuity on 
firms’ resources confirms that the discontinuity alters the value of the 
resource-bases differently depending on the types of resources firms possess, 
leading to varying patterns of reconfiguration.  
The focus on the structural characteristics of an alliance portfolio 
strengthens the link between the alliance portfolio and organizational design 
literatures, and demonstrates the value of extending organizational design 
theory to alliance portfolios. 
The thesis also makes two empirical contributions by utilizing a 
rigorous method of establishing termination dates of alliances and by 
identifying an exogenous technological discontinuity for careful examination 
of the reconfiguration process following an external shock. 
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In sum, the evaluation of alliance portfolio reconfiguration after a 
technological discontinuity demonstrates that such reconfiguration is 
influenced by a combination of external stimuli and internal portfolio 
characteristics, and helps integrate the external shocks and alliance portfolio 
literatures. Collectively, these findings advance understanding of the impact of 
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An effective alliance portfolio comprises a stable set of direct alliances that 
allows firms to obtain resources from partners at lower total cost than through 
market exchange or internal development (Lavie 2007, Lavie and Miller 2008, 
Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010). Firms establish their portfolio of 
alliances based on their existing and prospective need for resources and the 
potential for partners to provide these resources (Wassmer 2010).  
In spite of advances in our understanding of the collective properties of 
alliance portfolios, and of the relationship between alliance portfolios and 
resources (Wassmer 2010), the phenomenon of change and evolution of 
alliance portfolios is understudied. Therefore, researchers have called for 
studies to investigate “how and why firms change the configuration of their 
alliance portfolios over time” (Wassmer 2010, p.162). My dissertation is 
motivated by and seeks to answer this call. I pose two interrelated research 
questions and answer them in two essays. 
The first essay investigates how a technological discontinuity leads firms 
to reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming new alliances and 
disbanding current alliances. The second essay examines how structural 
properties of alliance portfolios shape their reconfiguration following the 
discontinuity. Reconfiguration is primarily driven by how the technological 
discontinuity alters the value of firms’ resources; this represents the 
fundamental relationship that I investigate in this study.  
I test my hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 331 firms from the 
global biopharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2000, a period which 
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experienced a technological discontinuity in the form of the emergence of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening in 1995. This 
discontinuity radically altered the drug development process, and the value of 
resources used in this process. 
 
Essay 1 
In essay 1, I ask “how does a technological discontinuity that alters the value 
of firm resources cause firms to reconfigure their alliance portfolios?” 
Specifically, I evaluate how, following a technological discontinuity, firms 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming new alliances to access 
required resources and by disbanding current alliances that provide redundant 
resources. I frame my analysis using the resource-based view (Barney 1991, 
Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984) and the literature on alliance portfolios (Lavie 
2007, Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010) to evaluate the relationship 
between technological discontinuities, firm resources and alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration. 
The impact of a technological discontinuity on firms depends on the 
nature of the discontinuity and on firms’ resources. A technological 
discontinuity is a “technical advance so significant that no increase in scale, 
efficiency, or design can make older technologies competitive with the new 
technology” (Tushman and Anderson 1986, p.441). 
 A discontinuity typically necessitates new resources, reinforces or 
challenges the value of some resources, and may potentially make other 
resources obsolete. I consider resources in terms of whether they are 
challenged, reinforced, new, or unaffected relative to the discontinuity. I 
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propose that following a technological discontinuity, firms are more likely to 
disband and form alliances for resources whose value is challenged by the 
discontinuity. Furthermore, they are more likely to form but less likely to 
disband alliances for resources whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity. 
Also, firms are more likely to form alliances for new resources required by the 
discontinuity. Finally, I propose that the costs of alliances and the need to 
optimize the composition and value of an alliance portfolio will cause firms 
forming new alliances to also disband more alliances following a 
discontinuity. Thus, a technological discontinuity that alters the value of firms’ 
resources and of their allies’ resources will lead to increased formation and 
disbandment of alliances as part of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. In sum, I 
show that technological discontinuities are important drivers of alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration. 
 
Motivation and Contributions 
Given the emerging interest in alliance portfolios, my dissertation contributes 
to improving understanding of the portfolio evolution mechanisms (Wassmer 
2010). Particularly, the investigation of the process of alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration in Essay 1 is motivated by several caveats in the field and, 
therefore contributes to the literature on portfolios in several ways. Research 
on alliance portfolios is at a nascent stage and, the evolution of alliance 
portfolios is understudied (Lavie and Singh (2012) is a recent exception). 
However, the implicit assumption seems to be that the findings of research on 
evolution of dyadic alliances can be extended to portfolios. In other words, it 
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seems reasonable to assume that alliance portfolios should evolve in the same 
manner that dyadic alliance ties or networks evolve.  
Research on evolution of alliances generally suggests that their 
evolution is mainly driven by path-dependency or natural life-cycle. The main 
thesis of the research that focuses on path-dependency is that evolution of 
alliances at any time is significantly guided by past conditions. For example, 
Gulati (1995) proposed that firms are likely to form alliances with partners 
whom they had allied with in the past because the repeated interaction with the 
same partner reduces transaction costs. Extending similar ideas, Gulati and 
Gargiulo (1999) found that in addition to experiences with the same partner, 
having common partners and being interdependent may also shape alliance 
formation. Similar results on alliance evolution are found at the network level 
of analysis. Powell et al. (2005) showed how accumulative advantage of 
partners guides the change in composition and size of the network of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Ahuja (2000) showed how technical, commercial and 
social capital could guide alliance formation, suggesting path-dependency in 
alliance evolution.  
Similarly, a handful of other studies on evolution of alliances have 
focused on the life-cycle in guiding their evolution (Dwyer et al. 1987, Jap and 
Anderson 2007, Uzzi 1996). For example, Dwyer et al. (1987) developed a 
framework specifying the mechanisms through which dyadic interactions 
develop into shared value systems in buyer-seller relationships. Similarly, 
Uzzi (1996) found that prolonged interactions among partners lead to 
development of embedded ties that enhance their survival chance. Together, 
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these studies imply that alliances evolve mainly through endogenous processes 
rather than exogenous events (Lavie and Singh 2012).  
Extending the implications of studies of dyadic alliance ties to the 
portfolio level, a reasonable conclusion seems to be that alliance portfolios 
evolve endogenously. However, if alliance portfolios, as sets of direct ties, 
mainly evolve endogenously, the question remains as to how firms would 
reconfigure them following an exogenous stimulus in the environment that 
alters the value of their current or required resources. In other words, how 
would alliance portfolios remain relevant in the face of an exogenous stimulus 
if they mainly evolve through path-dependence or life-cycle processes?  
This assumed endogeneity of alliance portfolio evolution is also 
paradoxical to the recommendations of studies that have investigated the 
relationship between firms’ performance and alliance portfolios’ composition 
and characteristics. Several studies have examined how firms benefit from 
different characteristics of alliance portfolios, including internationalization 
(Lavie and Miller 2008), intensity of competition (Lavie 2007), governance 
diversity (Jiang et al. 2010), and other characteristics (Wassmer 2010). Had 
the evolution been only guided by path-dependency or natural life-cycle, the 
recommendations of these studies on the optimum composition of alliance 
portfolios would have been of limited value.  
I make two theoretical and two empirical contributions. First, I 
improve understanding of how firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios, an 
issue that has received little attention. I respond to calls to investigate “how 
and why firms change the configuration of their alliance portfolios over time” 
(Wassmer 2010, p.162). Second, I expand the study of alliance portfolio 
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reconfiguration to show that in addition to internal processes, exogenous 
stimuli-- in the form of technological discontinuities-- influence the evolution 
of alliance portfolios.  
Relatedly, this study shows that firms actively manage alliance 
portfolios, such that alliances in a portfolio are not independent of each other, 
but in fact affect each other; the formation of new alliances is related to the 
disbandment of current alliances. These results support the value of studying 
alliances from a portfolio perspective, which may provide a more complete 
picture than from studying them as independent ties. 
The findings have implications for the literature on the resource-based 
view and on technological discontinuities, since they signify the value of 
evaluating changes in the value of resources from an evolutionary economics 
perspective rather than an ecological point of view (Lavie 2006). The 
competence enhancing-destroying framework proposed by Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) employs an ecological perspective of technological 
discontinuities that either destroy the bulk of a firm’s resources or 
significantly increase their value, thereby challenging the existence of the 
firm. Applying an evolutionary economics lens (Nelson and Winter 1982), the 
effects of the technological discontinuity in this study rest between the 
extremes of competence-enhancing and competence-destroying. 
Finally, the insights gained from this essay have implications for the 
studies on evolution of networks of alliances (Ahuja et al. 2012) since alliance 
portfolio reconfigurations through formation of new ties and disbandment of 
current ties may be “the engines of network evolution” (Ozcan and Eisenhardt 
2009, p. 246). These insights suggest that networks’ structures change 
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following reconfiguration of portfolios by firms (i.e. the nodes) when they 
respond to radical changes in the environment in the form of technological 
discontinuities. Further, these changes are due to the change in the value of 
resources being exchanged through alliance ties.  
Also, my analyses have shown that firms have limited capacity for 
involvement in multiple alliances. Therefore, addition of new ties to the 
network may lead to further disbandment of current ties.   
Empirically, I pay particular attention to establishing the duration of 
alliances by establishing a rigorous process for determining the disbandment 
of alliances, a critical issue for the study of portfolio reconfiguration; most 
studies do not establish this key event reliably.  My focus on reconfiguration 
within a single industry over an 11-year period responds to calls to use 
“…multi-firm panel data on the evolution of alliance portfolios in particular 
industries” (Lavie and Singh 2012, p. 803). 
Similarly, my method for identifying an exogenous event and using it 
for studying alliance portfolio reconfiguration contributes to the empirical 
aspects of evolution of alliances at different levels of analysis. Ahuja et al. 
(2012, p. 446) called for such a methodology, acknowledging that “using 
exogenous shocks to identify effects is a promising arena, but finding data 
contexts with clear and usable exogenous shocks will remain a challenge.” 
 
Findings 
Results show that firms respond to technological discontinuities by 
reconfiguring their alliance portfolios, by forming new alliances and by 
disbanding current alliances. Firms are more likely to disband alliances for 
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resources whose value is challenged by the discontinuity. The challenge to the 
value of resources reduces the value of alliances that provide these resources, 
increasing their disbandment likelihood. Even if the current partners have the 
ability to provide the upgraded resources, firms are still likely to disband 
current alliances because resources specific to these alliances possibly lose 
their value under altered conditions (Dyer and Singh 1998).   
 Firms are also more likely to form alliances for challenged resources 
after the discontinuity. These resources, though challenged, do not lose their 
entire value. Firms, therefore, look for partners who can help them upgrade 
these resources, increasing the likelihood of formation of alliances for 
challenged resources, though after a significant lag between the technological 
discontinuities. Formation of alliances for challenged resources may hinge on 
the availability of the partners who can help firms upgrade their resources 
(Adner and Kapoor 2010, Castrogiovanni 1991, Park and Mezias 2005). Firms 
may only be able to find suitable partners for upgrading their challenged 
resources after a delay, possibly after uncertainties on the resource needs and 
potential partners’ capabilities are resolved. 
 Next, the results show that firms are more likely to form alliances for 
resources whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity. The reinforcement of 
the value of resources increases the value of the partnerships through which 
they are obtained, increasing the formation likelihood of alliances for 
reinforced resources. The potential to provide resources may increase the 




Contrary to the initial predictions, firms were more likely to disband 
alliances for reinforced resources. This result seems counterintuitive because 
the value of such alliances should increase following the technological 
discontinuity, decreasing their disbandment likelihood.  
One interpretation of the evidence on the increased disbandment 
likelihood of alliances is that following a technological discontinuity, the 
alliance-specific assets deployed by partners to communicate and coordinate 
their activities (Gulati and Singh 1998) may lose their specificity and, 
consequently, their rent-generating potential (Dyer and Singh 1998). Assets 
deployed for coordination and communication in an alliance can be a source of 
competitive advantage and rent-generation when well-tuned to the partners 
and the resources being exchanged between them (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
Therefore, following an increase in the value of the resources that were 
initially exchanged between partners, firms may re-examine and disband their 
alliances for reinforced resources and form new alliances for such resources 
with specific assets that are tuned to the new conditions.   
The increase in the importance of reinforced resources may lead to the 
reexamination of the pre-discontinuity governance and contractual structures 
of such alliances. Hence, firms may look to replace current alliances with new 
alliances with new governance mechanisms that are more effective in 
restricting opportunism, resolving potential conflicts and re-assigning 
incentives to the partners (Ariño and Reuer 2004, Reuer and Ariño 2007, 
Williamson 1991).Therefore, firms may be more likely to disband alliances for 
resources reinforced by a technological discontinuity. 
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The results also show that firms were more likely to form alliances for 
access to the new resources following the discontinuity. The emergence of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening technology in 1995 
led firms to form alliances for accessing the new resources that could 
potentially enable them to develop therapeutic compounds at a fraction of the 
cost of traditional synthetic methods.   
  Finally, the results showed that greater formation of alliances for 
reinforced resources could cause more disbandment of alliances for challenged 
resources because as firms add more alliances to their portfolios, resources for 
the maintenance of their alliances are more widely distributed (Ocasio 1997, 
Singh and Mitchell 1996). Formation of multiple ties spreads firm resources 
and, consequently, the likelihood of disbandment of their existing alliances 
increases. 
 These results suggest that firms actively manage their alliances as a 
portfolio to meet their resource needs. Therefore, evolution of alliance 




Building on the insights from Essay 1, in Essay 2 I examine “how the 
reconfiguration of alliance portfolios is shaped by their structural properties.” 
As with the first essay, I frame my analysis using research on alliance 
portfolios (Kale and Singh 2009, Lavie 2007, Lavie 2009, Lavie and Singh 
2011, Wassmer 2010) and the resource-based view (Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 
1984), while introducing the organizational design literature (Galbraith 1977, 
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Gulati et al. 2012, Puranam et al. 2012, Tushman and Nadler 1978) to propose 
that alliance portfolio reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity 
is influenced by two key properties of the portfolio, the interdependence of the 
focal firm and its portfolio partners and the technological diversity of the 
portfolio. 
A firm is interdependent with its portfolio partners when the control 
over the necessary conditions for the achievement of the outcomes desired 
from the portfolio is shared between the firm and its alliance portfolio 
partners. A focal firm’s interdependence with its partners will influence 
portfolio reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity because of 
the need to replace the resources provided by partners and the costs of 
dismantling communication and coordination mechanisms between the firm 
and its partners. I propose that greater interdependence between the focal firm 
and its alliance portfolio partners will reduce portfolio reconfiguration 
following a technological discontinuity. 
Technological diversity of an alliance portfolio refers to the degree to 
which alliance ties in the portfolio potentially transfer diverse technological 
resources between the firm and its partners. It indicates the technological 
diversity of the resources the focal firm may access from partners. A firm that 
has a more technologically diverse alliance portfolio is more likely to access 
technologically diverse resources from its alliance partners, and is more likely 
to have built capabilities to deal with such diverse sets of resources 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Grant 1996, Kogut and Zander 1996). 
Furthermore, firms that are engaged in technologically diverse portfolios are 
likely to be more explorative in their search behavior leading them to be more 
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responsive to environmental stimuli (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Lavie et al. 
2010, March 1991). Therefore, I propose that following a technological 
discontinuity, firms with more technologically diverse alliance portfolios are 
more likely to sense the changes and form and disband alliances for different 
types of resources. 
These structural properties of alliance portfolios also jointly shape the 
reconfiguration process. Lower interdependence reduces the constraints to 
reconfiguration, due to more flexible structures. More technologically diverse 
alliance portfolios are more likely to be reconfigured following an external 
stimulus. As a result, I propose that alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
following a technological discontinuity is likely to be greater with lower 
interdependence and greater technological diversity in the alliance portfolios. 
 
Motivation and Contributions 
The main premise of the alliance portfolio literature is that alliance portfolios 
have collective properties (Parise and Casher 2003, Wassmer 2010). These 
properties imply that the formation and disbandment of alliance ties are not 
independent of the current structure of alliance portfolios. As such, the study 
of alliance portfolio reconfiguration is incomplete without taking into account 
the characteristics of the portfolio that may condition reconfiguration. 
Therefore, the second essay sheds light on the factors that shape 
reconfiguration of alliance portfolios following technological discontinuities. 
These factors may partially explain variation in alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration across firms. 
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Relatedly, this study shows that firms actively manage alliance 
portfolios, such that they take into account the costs and difficulties of 
reconfiguration. Therefore, it indicates the value of studying alliances from a 
portfolio perspective, which may provide a more complete picture than from 
studying them as independent ties. For example, the research on alliance 
survival can benefit from the insight into alliance portfolios. The research on 
alliance survival and termination (e.g., Lunnan and Haugland 2008) has 
studied alliances as independent ties. Overlooking the fact that firms 
increasingly maintain their alliances as portfolios (Parise and Casher 2003) 
and that portfolios have structural properties capable of shaping their 
disbandment may lead to bias in estimation of the antecedents of alliances’ 
survival. 
This study also contributes to the examination of firms’ responses to 
technological discontinuities in general (Reinganum 1983, Tripsas 1997, 
Tushman and Anderson 1986). Researchers are divided on whether and how 
firms respond to technological discontinuities. While some studies highlight 
the advantages of new entrants into an industry (e.g., Anderson and Tushman 
1990, Dobrev et al. 2003, Henderson and Clark 1990), other scholars 
acknowledge the advantages of incumbents in surviving the selective 
pressures of technological discontinuities (e.g., Singh 1997, Tripsas 1997). 
The latter particularly have recognized the role of alliances in helping firms 
survive and adapt to the discontinuities (Lavie and Singh 2011, Rothaermel 
2001, 2002, Singh 1997). This study’s findings that different properties of 
alliance portfolios encourage or discourage reconfiguration in the face of 
discontinuities highlight the importance of studying alliances not only as 
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individual ties, but as part of portfolios of related and collectively-managed 
ties. While alliances are helpful for providing resources, certain configurations 
of alliance portfolios may hinder firms’ response to discontinuities. 
Particularly, relying heavily on partners could hinder firms’ response to 
exogenous shocks. 
The findings of the study have yet a broader implication for research   
on organizational design literature (Gulati and Singh 1998, Puranam et al. 
2012). Research suggests that investment on inter-partner or inter-department 
communication and integration help agents coordinate their activities and 
manage their interdependencies in static environments where flexibility and 
agility are not particularly important (Tushman and Nadler 1978). The results 
of this essay show that interdependence between the focal firm and its 
portfolio partners may undermine its flexibility to respond through portfolio 
reconfiguration to changing environmental conditions-- in the form of 
technological discontinuities.  
 
Findings 
The results show that a focal firm’s interdependence with its alliance portfolio 
partners hinders its alliance portfolio reconfiguration.  Interdependence 
requires the firm to coordinate its actions with its partners (Aggarwal et al. 
2011, Gulati and Singh 1998, Gulati et al. 2012, Litwak and Hylton 1962, 
Puranam et al. 2012). Coordination, in turn, requires mutual adjustment of 
actions, communication, and information sharing (Gulati et al. 2012, Tushman 
and Nadler 1978). Firms tend to invest in more integrative forms of alliances 
and alliance specific-assets to facilitate information sharing and 
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communication with their partners (Galbraith 1974, Gulati et al. 2012, 
Puranam et al. 2012). These investments make it costlier and harder for firms 
to disband current alliances and form new alliances in more interdependent 
portfolios, impeding alliance portfolio reconfiguration following a 
technological discontinuity. 
The results also support the idea that the technological diversity of an 
alliance portfolio facilitates reconfiguration. Firms that are engaged in 
technologically diverse portfolios have greater exposure to broader sets of 
markets and industries, and thus are likely to have greater capabilities in 
organizing and adapting to changes in their environment (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf 2006, Lavie et al. 2010, March 1991). These capabilities may be 
transferable to alliance portfolio reconfiguration, allowing these firms to 
undertake greater reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity.  
The interaction of interdependence and technological diversity 
influences portfolio reconfiguration, as firms with more diverse and less 
interdependent alliance portfolios reconfigure more following a technological 
discontinuity. This shows that the overall structural properties of alliance 
portfolios affect their reconfiguration, and by implication, their effectiveness. 
Though this is consistent with the view that alliance portfolios have collective 
properties, the impact of portfolio structure is under-studied.   
 This study suggests that firms increase reconfiguration of their alliance 
portfolios following a technological discontinuity. Moreover, the 
reconfiguration process is likely to be shaped by the structural properties of 
the portfolios. As firms differ with respect to the properties of their portfolios, 




ESSAY 1: ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO RECONFIGURATION 
FOLLOWING A TECHNOLOGICAL DISCONTINUITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An effective alliance portfolio comprises a stable set of direct alliances that 
allows firms to obtain resources from partners at lower total cost than through 
market exchange or internal development (Lavie 2007, Lavie and Miller 2008, 
Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010). Firms establish their portfolio of 
alliances based on their existing and prospective need for resources and the 
potential for partners to provide these resources (Wassmer 2010). However, it 
is not clear how an external stimulus such as a technological discontinuity that 
alters the value of resources may lead firms to modify their alliance portfolios 
to improve access to required resources. In this essay I evaluate how a 
technological discontinuity that alters the value of different types of resources 
causes firms to reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming new alliances 
to access required resources and by disbanding current alliances that provide 
redundant resources. I frame my analysis using the resource-based view 
(Barney 1991, Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984) and the literature on alliance 
portfolios (Lavie 2007, Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010) to evaluate the 
relationship between technological discontinuities, firm resources and alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration. 
The impact of a technological discontinuity on firms depends on the 
nature of the discontinuity and on firms’ resources. A technological 
discontinuity is a “technical advance so significant that no increase in scale, 
efficiency, or design can make older technologies competitive with the new 
technology” (Tushman and Anderson 1986, p.441). Technological 
17 
 
discontinuities substantially alter the combinations of resources and 
capabilities that provide the basis for firms to compete within an industry. 
Resources are physical and virtual entities of limited availability that provide 
competitive benefits (Wernerfelt 1984). A discontinuity typically necessitates 
new resources, reinforces or challenges the value of some resources, and may 
potentially obsolete other resources. A technological discontinuity that affects 
the value of resources is likely to affect the value of the alliances in a 
portfolio, depending on the types of resources that these ties provide, leading 
to varying patterns of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. 
I consider resources in terms of whether they are challenged, 
reinforced, new, or unaffected relative to the discontinuity. I propose that, 
following a technological discontinuity, firms are more likely to disband and 
form alliances for resources whose value is challenged by the discontinuity. 
Furthermore, they are more likely to form but less likely to disband alliances 
for resources whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity. Also, firms are 
more likely to form alliances for new resources required by the discontinuity. 
Finally, I propose that the costs of alliances and the need to optimize the 
composition and value of an alliance portfolio will cause firms forming new 
alliances to also disband more alliances following a discontinuity. Thus, a 
technological discontinuity that alters the value of firms’ resources and of their 
allies’ resources will lead to increased formation and disbandment of alliances 
as part of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. In sum, I show that technological 
discontinuities are important drivers of alliance portfolio reconfiguration.  
Research on alliances suggests that their evolution is primarily driven 
by path-dependency (Dwyer et al. 1987, Jap and Anderson 2007, Lavie and 
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Singh 2012, Rosenkopf and Padula 2008, Uzzi 1996). Gulati (1995) proposed 
that firms are more likely to form new alliances with current partners because 
repeated interaction reduces transaction costs, while Uzzi  (1996) found that 
prolonged interactions among partners lead to stronger ties. Extending similar 
ideas, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) found that common partners and 
interdependence between firms influence alliance formation. Powell et al. 
(2005) showed that the number of partners a firm has guides changes in the 
composition and size of its network. Collectively, these studies imply that 
alliances and, therefore, alliance portfolios evolve mainly through internal 
processes. However, how alliance portfolios change in response to exogenous 
external events (Lavie and Singh 2012) is understudied. Therefore, it is not 
clear if and how firms will reconfigure their alliance portfolios following an 
exogenous external stimulus that alters the value of their resource bases. 
I test my hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of 331 firms from the 
global biopharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2000, a period which 
experienced a technological discontinuity in the form of the emergence of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening in 1995. This 
discontinuity radically altered the drug development process, and the value of 
resources used in this process. 
I make two theoretical contributions and two empirical contributions. 
First, I improve understanding of how firms reconfigure their alliance 
portfolios, an issue that has received little attention. I respond to calls to 
investigate “how and why firms change the configuration of their alliance 
portfolios over time” (Wassmer 2010, p.162). Second, I expand the study of 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration to show that in addition to internal 
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processes, exogenous stimuli-- in the form of technological discontinuities-- 
influence the evolution of alliance portfolios. Empirically, I pay particular 
attention to establishing the duration of alliances by establishing the 
disbandment of alliances, a critical issue for the study of portfolio 
reconfiguration; most studies do not establish this key event reliably.   
My focus on reconfiguration within a single industry over an 11-year 
period responds to calls to use “…multi-firm panel data on the evolution of 
alliance portfolios in particular industries” (Lavie and Singh 2012, p.803). 
Similarly, my method for identifying an exogenous event and using it for 
studying alliance portfolio reconfiguration contributes to the empirical aspects 
of evolution of alliances at different levels of analysis. Ahuja et al. (2012, p. 
446) called for such a methodology acknowledging that “using exogenous 
shocks to identify effects is a promising arena, but finding data context with 
clear and usable exogenous shocks will remain a challenge.” 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Alliance Portfolios 
Alliances are possible means for firms to access external resources to 
overcome internal resources shortages (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996, 
Gulati 1998, Lavie 2007, Lavie and Singh 2012, Mitchell and Singh 1992, 
Singh 1997). Alliances are traditionally studied as dyadic ties (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad 1994, Mowery et al. 1996) or as components of a network (Ahuja 
2000a, Ahuja et al. 2009, Gulati et al. 2000, Powell et al. 1996). Research has 
recently focused on a firm’s portfolio of alliances to provide more complete 
understanding of the relationship between alliances and firms’ performance 
(Hoffmann 2007, Kale and Singh 2009, Lavie and Singh 2012, Ozcan and 
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Eisenhardt 2009, Parise and Casher 2003, Wassmer 2010). This research 
recognizes that firms manage their alliances as portfolios of alliances, rather 
than as independent ties.  Managing a portfolio of alliances requires that firms 
manage the collective properties of the portfolio, with these properties guiding 
the establishment and disbandment of individual alliances. 
The value of an alliance portfolio lies in how well it provides resources 
that a firm needs. Firms primarily design their portfolios to include partners 
that can provide necessary resources.  In seeking to access a range of 
resources, firms may establish portfolios that differ in terms of governance 
diversity (Jiang et al. 2010), competitive intensity (Lavie 2007), 
internationalization (Lavie and Miller 2008), or partners’ activities and 
resources (Wassmer  2010) . The effectiveness of an alliance portfolio will 
depend, in part, on the relationships between partners, and on the alliances 
providing resources approximating ex ante expectations. Firms will typically 
disband alliances that fail to deliver promised resources or whose costs exceed 
the value of the resources delivered. 
However, it is costly to modify alliance portfolios.  There are 
substantial costs involved in searching for partners, evaluating their suitability, 
achieving agreement, and in structuring and managing the relationship (Ariño 
and Reuer 2004, Reuer and Ariño 2007, Williamson 1991). Alliances with 
new partners may also expose firms to the risk of loss of valuable resources 
(Oxley and Wada 2009, Oxley  1999). Similarly, there are costs to disbanding 
alliances. First, there will be costs in disbanding relationships, and dismantling 
governance and coordinating structures (Gulati and Singh 1998). Alliance 
disbandment may damage reputations by signaling firms’ inability to partners 
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(Park and Ungson 2001). Disagreement over property rights and other 
conflicts may be time-consuming and costly to disentangle, particularly if 
litigation results (Park and Ungson 2001, Smith 2005). Firms may also have to 
bear the costs of establishing new alliances to replace the resources lost in 
disbanded partnerships.  
In general, there are substantial costs to restructuring an alliance 
portfolio, both in adding new alliances and in disbanding existing alliances. 
These costs will be particularly substantial and the reconfiguration especially 
disruptive if firms add and disband multiple alliances within a short period of 
time. Therefore, firms will undertake reconfiguration of their alliance 
portfolios only when the benefits of doing so exceed associated costs. 
 
Technological Discontinuities 
A technological discontinuity may lead firms to reconfigure their alliance 
portfolios to improve access to resources to remain competitive in the post-
discontinuity period. Technological discontinuities are often treated as having 
two extreme effects on resources, competence-enhancing or competence-
destroying (Tushman and Anderson 1986).1 At their limits, competence-
destroying discontinuities make affected resources obsolete, while 
competence-enhancing discontinuities substantially increase the value of some 
resources (Tushman and Anderson 1986). Studies of technological 
discontinuities often assume this dichotomous impact on resources, whose 
                                                            
1 Capabilities and competencies mobilize the resources for generating rents (Teece et 
al. 1997). For the purposes of this thesis, I treat competencies as analogous to 
capabilities, and as being closely related to resources.  
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value is either increased substantially or destroyed completely (e.g., Anderson 
and Tushman 1990). 
I diverge from the competence enhancing and destroying 
conceptualization of discontinuities to view their impact as ranging along a 
continuum between the extremes of competence enhancing and destroying. 
Following the resource-based view (Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984), I regard 
firms as possessing bundles of heterogeneous resources (Barney 1991, Penrose 
1959, Wernerfelt 1984). Technological discontinuities will have varying 
impact on different types of resources, depending on the nature of the 
discontinuity and the characteristics of the resources. In turn, the varying 
impact on different resources will result in discontinuities affecting firms to 
varying degrees, depending on the composition of their bundle of resources. I 
therefore predict that the effect of a technological discontinuity on firms will 
vary along a continuum depending on their internal mix of resources 
(Gatignon et al. 2002, Lavie 2006). In contrast, studies of technological 
discontinuities often assume that discontinuities either enhance or destroy the 
firm resources and do not evaluate varying effects within and across firms 
(e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
Discontinuities may have particularly divergent impact on resources 
immediately following the discontinuity, because of uncertainty over the 
specific nature and impact of the change. Firms often increase collaboration to 
understand how the disruption may affect the need for resources and explore 
new opportunities during this “era of ferment” (Anderson and Tushman 1990). 
Therefore, the effect of a technological discontinuity will vary across 
firms and within each firm’s set of resources. A technological discontinuity 
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may challenge the value of some resources, simultaneously reinforce the value 
of other resources, and require firms to obtain entirely new resources. It is also 
possible that some resources may not be affected at all while others may be 
made obsolete. The change in the value of resources will lead firms to form 
new alliances and disband some current alliances, depending on the specific 
impact of the discontinuity on resources. I focus on three categories of 
resources within the extremes of competence-destroying and competence-
enhancing change: challenged resources, reinforced resources and new 
resources. I next evaluate how firms restructure their alliance portfolios when 
the resources they obtain from different partners are challenged or reinforced, 
or when firms require new resources.  
 
Alliances for Challenged Resources 
A technological discontinuity ushers in a paradigm shift which may redefine 
problems and their solutions (Dosi 1982, Glasmeier 1991). Challenged 
resources, in their traditional forms, become less relevant and useful as 
solutions to new problems under the new paradigm. For instance, the 
discontinuity of combinatorial chemistry in the pharmaceutical industry made 
it possible to generate vast libraries of synthetic molecular structures, thereby 
replacing the old paradigm of computer-aided molecule design of the 1980s by 
generating vast arrays of structurally similar molecules at a fraction of the cost 
of traditional methods.  Under the new combinatorial paradigm, the problem 
of using the computer to design a single molecule was replaced by the 
problem of searching through large collections of molecules to identify those 
with desired chemical and biological properties (Carroll 2005). As a 
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consequence, traditional bioinformatics resources of industry incumbents were 
challenged.  
Technological discontinuities, therefore, may challenge certain 
resources and reduce their value by undermining their applications and uses. 
The reduced value of challenged resources undermines the value of alliances 
providing these resources. This will increase the likelihood that firms will 
disband more of these alliances to reduce costs and to redeploy resources into 
more productive uses (Capron et al. 1998). Firms may choose not to continue 
with existing alliances to obtain the upgraded resources because partners may 
be viewed as lacking the ability to provide these resources. Furthermore, the 
challenge to the resources could reduce the value of specific assets invested in 
these alliances for coordination, communication and rent generation (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) leading to their disbandment. Firms may also seek to disband ties 
for challenged resources, to release capacity for new alliances, because of the 
costs of managing alliances and as there are limits to the number of alliances 
firms can manage in a portfolio (Ocasio 1997, 2011, Singh and Mitchell 
1996). Hence:   
H1a (challenged resources – disbandment): Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of disbanding alliances for resources whose 
value is challenged by the discontinuity will increase. 
Though technological discontinuities reduce the value of challenged 
resources, these resources are not made fully obsolete and are required to 
some degree for firms to remain competitive. Firms may therefore be required 
to upgrade challenged resources, modify them, or combine them with other 
resources for them to continue to provide value, with the extent of 
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modification varying with the impact of the discontinuity. Firms may seek to 
upgrade, modify or combine challenged resources internally, but could also 
chose to obtain these resources from existing alliances.  However, current 
partners may not possess the capabilities or resources to improve the 
challenged resources or to provide the complementary resources required. This 
may require firms to form new alliances for challenged resources, even while 
disbanding other alliances for these resources, as argued in H1a. The 
underlying argument is that firms have heterogeneous resources and 
capabilities, so that a technological discontinuity can have varying impact on 
the value of challenged resources within firms.   
As noted above, the emergence of combinatorial chemistry challenged 
bioinformatics resources. Combinatorial chemistry increased the size and 
complexity of compound libraries of biopharmaceutical firms. Therefore, 
firms had to access bioinformatics resources with enhanced data storage, 
retrieval, classification, and processing capabilities. Biopharmaceutical firms 
formed alliances to access new and upgraded bioinformatics platforms.   
Therefore, firms may simultaneously disband current alliances and form 
new alliances for challenged resources. Hence:  
H1b (challenged resources – formation): Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of forming alliances for resources whose 
value is challenged by the discontinuity will increase.  
 
Alliances for Reinforced Resources 
A technological discontinuity may increase the value of some resources. 
Reinforced resources are those whose value increases following a 
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technological discontinuity or which increase in value because they are 
complementary to the new technologies (Grant 1996, Katila and Ahuja 2002), 
increasing the likelihood that firms will combine them with current resources 
for value creation (Grant 1996, Srivastava and Gnyawali 2011, Vasudeva and 
Anand 2011). Reinforced resources may facilitate firms’ entry into emerging 
fields created by the technological discontinuity (Mitchell 1989, Mitchell and 
Singh 1992). For example, flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) were a 
discontinuity for automobile manufacturers relying on highly integrated 
automated production lines. However, FMS reinforced the value of platform 
technologies of the automobile factories with diversified lines of products 
(Biesebroeck 2007). Similarly, the emergence of magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) reinforced the value of CT-scanners imaging and storage competencies 
(Mitchell 1989).  
Firms may continue to obtain reinforced resources from current 
partners. However, even resources whose value is reinforced may undergo 
some modification following a technological discontinuity. As firms have 
heterogeneous resources, some current partners may lack the capacity or 
capabilities to provide the resources in the required form. It is therefore likely 
that firms will seek to establish new alliances for these challenged resources. 
In addition, firms may also seek to form new alliances to ensure additional 
sources and availability of resources whose value has been reinforced.   
Therefore, firms are more likely to form alliances for resources whose 
value is reinforced by a technological discontinuity. Hence: 
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H2a (reinforced resources – formation): Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of forming alliances for resources whose 
value is reinforced by the discontinuity will increase. 
The disbandment of alliances for reinforced resources is likely to 
decrease following the discontinuity because the value of these resources, and 
therefore of alliances providing these resources, increase. The increase in the 
value of these resources would enhance the attractiveness of current 
partnerships with their providers, reducing the likelihood of disbandment of 
alliances for reinforced resources following the discontinuity. 
Partners that are involved in alliances for reinforced resources are also 
unlikely to disband them because following the discontinuity the value of the 
resources invested in coordination and communication and, consequently, rent 
generation from these alliances may increase (Dyer and Singh 1998). The 
partners are likely to continue collaborating as their pre-discontinuity 
experience in coordination, information sharing and resolving conflicts and 
contingencies would remain valuable following the increase in the value of the 
resources (Puranam et al. 2012). Hence: 
H2b (reinforced resources – disbandment): Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of disbanding alliances for resources 
whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity will decrease. 
 
Alliances for New Resources 
Technological discontinuities may bring about changes in the basis for 
competing in a particular product or industry, requiring new resources that 
were either unavailable or unknown to incumbents (Anderson and Tushman 
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1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986). The emergence of MRI required many 
firms to develop new resources in powerful magnetic fields (Mitchell 1989). 
Given the novelty of new resources and the uncertainty about their value, 
firms are more likely to use alliances to access these resources at lower total 
cost than through market exchange or internal development (Oxley 1997, 
Oxley and Sampson 2004, Singh and Mitchell 1996). 
  Internal development of new resources may be a suboptimal choice 
because of the substantial resources required, the technological challenges 
faced, and because there may be time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx 
and Cool 1989). Purchasing new resources or firms that possess these 
resources may not be feasible because the newness of these resources creates 
uncertainty on their value and development (Arora et al. 2001, Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994, Ziedonis 2007) and increases transactions costs (Williamson 
1991). Collaborative relationships may allow more efficient transfer of new 
resources (Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Szulanski 1996), as alliances mimic the 
flexibility of market exchange and the power of organizational hierarchy 
(Williamson 1991). The hybrid nature of alliances makes them conducive for 
the development and exchange of new resources, increasing the likelihood that 
firms will form alliances for new resources following a technological 
discontinuity. Hence: 
H3 (new resources – formation): Following a technological 





Interaction of Alliances 
Now consider interactions among multiple alliances involving different types 
of resources. Alliance portfolios have collective properties (Lavie 2007, Lavie 
and Singh 2012, Parise and Casher 2003, Vassolo et al. 2004, Wassmer 2010) 
that result from their deliberate design to comprise a set of alliances that meet 
firms’ resources requirements (Parise and Casher 2003, Reuer and Ragozzino 
2006). Alliance portfolios help firms cope with the discontinuity by accessing 
new resources, creating value from reinforced resources and upgrading 
challenged resources. 
As discussed above, firms invest in forming multiple alliances to 
restructure their resource-bases following a technological discontinuity. They 
also disband more alliances for challenged resources and fewer alliances for 
reinforced resources. Formation, coordination and disruption costs will 
constrain the size of alliance portfolios and the number of changes that can be 
undertaken within a time interval. Also, the costs of managing alliances will 
limit the number of alliances they can maintain (Ocasio 1997, Singh and 
Mitchell 1996). 
Firms are therefore likely to associate the formation of new alliances 
with the disbandment of existing alliances, as they reconfigure their portfolio. 
Firms are likely to balance the risks and costs of disbanding or forming an 
alliance by considering the other alliances disbanded or formed. As a result, 
the formation of new alliances is likely to be influenced by the increased 
disbandment of existing alliances. In particular, firms will disband more 
alliances for challenged resources, the more alliances for reinforced or new 
resources they form, as part of the management of costs and the creation of 
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alliance formation capacity. Therefore, the formation of alliances for 
reinforced or new resources will increase the disbandment of alliances for 
challenged resources. Hence: 
H4a (reinforced resource formation - challenged disbandment): 
Following a technological discontinuity, the more alliances for 
reinforced resources that firms form, the more alliances for challenged 
resources that they will disband. 
H4b (new resource formation - challenged disbandment): Following a 
technological discontinuity, the more alliances for new resources that 
firms form, the more alliances for challenged resources that they will 
disband. 
In summary, I predict that following a technological discontinuity, 
disbandment likelihood (H1a) and formation likelihood (H1b) of alliances for 
challenged resources will both increase; formation likelihood of alliances for 
reinforced resources will increase (H2a) while disbandment likelihood will 
decrease (H2b); and formation likelihood of alliances for new resources will 
increase (H3). In addition, the more alliances for reinforced (H4a) and new 
resources (H4b) that firms form, the more alliances for challenged resources 




The setting for this study is the global biopharmaceutical industry. Two 
aspects of this industry make it an appropriate context for this study. First, this 
industry experiences high rates of change through continuous scientific 
discoveries and technological revolutions, some of which strike the industry as 
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discontinuities. Second, alliances are a major feature of the industry, which 
firms establish to overcome technological and resource challenges (Pisano 
2006). Many firms organize and manage these alliances as portfolios (Vassolo 
et al. 2004).  
The industry experienced a major technological discontinuity in 1995 
through the introduction of combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening. Combinatorial chemistry refers to the “process by which millions of 
molecular constructions can be created and tested simultaneously and which 
underlies the speed of new drug development” (Beeley and Berger 2000, 
p.581). The reference to test procedures encompasses high-throughput 
screening, which emerged as complementary technology to combinatorial 
chemistry because it allowed rapid and large scale testing of new drugs. These 
technologies revolutionized the early stages of the drug discovery process; 
substantially reducing the cost and time for developing candidates for drugs 
(Persidis 1997) as shown in Table 2.1. As a result they represented a major 
technological discontinuity that radically altered the value of resources, 
increasing the value of some resources while reducing the value of others. 
Table 2.1 Efficiency Gain through Adoption of Combinatorial Chemistry and 
High-throughput Screening  
 Traditional chemistry Combinatorial 
chemistry 
Number of compounds 
per chemist per month 
4 3,300 
Total cost $30,000 $40,000 
Cost per compound  $7,500 $12 
Source: Persidis (1997) 
 
Despite the potential gains, there were considerable barriers to the 
adoption and implementation of these technologies. The new modes of drug 
discovery required extensive communication across scientific and business 
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departments (Henderson 1994) and relied on bioinformatics resources and 
mechanized testing to develop and deal with the new molecular diversity that 
the new technologies produced. Bioinformatics and mechanized testing were 
emerging technologies in the industry in the early 1990s. 
Following the discontinuity, new resources different from those for 
traditional chemical and manual processes were required, some resources were 
reinforced, and others were challenged. Many chemists and firms experienced 
in the conventional methodologies were hesitant to shift to the emerging 
discovery paradigm (Nicolaou et al. 2002). However, the potential benefits of 
these methods offset concerns, leading many firms to invest in them in the 
1990s (Loch et al. 2001, Persidis 1995, 1997, 1998, Swanson 2002, Thomke 
and Kuemmerle 2002).  
Figure 2.1 suggests that the technological discontinuity occurred in 
1995. The slow but steady increase in the number of papers on the two 
technologies and the sudden surge in 1995 are consistent with the exponential 
patterns found in the studies of technology diffusion (Bass 1969, Norton and 
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System) codes 325412, 325413, and 3254142 that were publicly listed at any 
time between 1990 and 2000. I excluded firms that exited the industry before 
1995 or that entered after this year, as these firms did not experience the 
technological discontinuity, resulting in a sample of 519 firms.  
I restricted my analysis to the years 1990 to 2000 for three reasons. 
First, this period straddled the discontinuity in 1995 and was long enough to 
permit the establishment and disbandment of alliances. Second, alliance data 
before 1990 was not consistently available. Third, the study period ended 
before the discontinuity posed by the human genome mapping, which 
commenced in 2001, to avoid confounding effects. 
The RECAP database (www.recap.com) provided alliance data. 
RECAP records many alliances in the healthcare industry and has been used in 
previous research as a reliable data source (Schilling 2009). I screened all 519 
firms in my sample to ensure that each had at least one alliance between 1990 
and 2000. This filter yielded a final sample of 331 firms with 12,190 ties.  
Firms remained in the sample after 1995 unless they exited the industry or 
were acquired. I used these 331 firms as the focal firms with alliance 
portfolios. These firms were distributed as follows: 76% US, 3% Japan, 2% 
Germany, 2% France, with 17% from 16 other countries. 
Next, I ensured that all ties reported in the database were alliances. Of 
the 12,190 biopharmaceutical industry cooperative deals reported by RECAP, 
I established that only 6,136 were alliances. Several types of deals, such as 
                                                            
2 325412: Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing; 325413: In-Vitro Diagnostic 




letters of intent, warrants and other similar types were discarded as not 
comprising alliances.    
 
Measurement 
Dependent Variables. The main dependent variables are the number of 
alliances formed for reinforced, challenged and new resources and the number 
of alliances disbanded for reinforced and challenged resources. Information on 
the formation of each alliance is recorded by RECAP. However, RECAP 
reported disbandment dates for only 10% of the cases. The absence of 
disbandment information is a common problem because most firms do not 
publicly announce disbandment of their alliances (Schilling 2009, Schilling 
and Phelps 2007).  
To overcome the absence of data on disbandment dates, I performed an 
extensive search of the 6,136 alliances using the following process: each 
alliance in RECAP is identified by the name of the two involved partners, date 
of formation, subject of the partnership, the technology involved in the 
collaboration, the therapeutic area that the alliance dealt with, and several 
other data fields that can identify an alliance. For each alliance, I searched 
Factiva (www.dowjones.com/factiva) for relevant press releases using 
partners’ names and the subject of the alliance from the first day of the year in 
which the alliance was formed. The query involved the names of the partners 
and subject of the alliance3. When the subject of the alliance was not specific, 
I combined other fields of the alliance characteristics into the query to find 
relevant press releases. If the search term did not yield a relevant result, I 
                                                            
3 Several firms underwent name changes. I carefully checked the history of name 
changes of all firms through press release searches. 
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incorporated different combinations of data fields to obtain the most 
comprehensive stream of press releases. In 15% of the cases, I found a press 
release that discussed disbandment of the alliance. In such cases, the year of 
the press release was recorded as the date of disbandment.  
For the other alliances, I followed the stream of press releases and 
recorded the last year that at least one press release reported the alliance as the 
disbandment year. This is a reasonable approximation because alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry are closely watched by media and industry 
analysts. Several studies show that capital markets are sensitive to alliances 
announcements (Anand and Khanna 2000, Kale et al. 2002). Alliances are 
particularly important among biopharmaceutical firms, who often provide 
public updates on the progress of their alliances. This procedure provides a 
more reliable estimate of disbandment of alliances than the common approach 
of assuming disbandment between three to five years (e.g., Stuart 2000). 
I also accounted for acquisitions made by the focal firms. When a firm 
is acquired, its alliances are inherited by the acquiring firm, except where anti-
trust regulations may require that they be disbanded. I checked the acquisitions 
made by the focal firms in the sample. Then, I extracted the alliances that 
acquired firms formed before their acquisitions by the focal firms between 
1990 and 2000. Using Factiva, I detected the alliances that were inherited by 
the focal firms after they had acquired any of the partners involved in such 
alliances. These types of alliances constitute 9.53% of the cases in my sample.  
The next step in building the dependent variables was to identify the 
impact of the technological discontinuity on the primary resources provided by 
each alliance. Each alliance in RECAP is defined by the technology that is the 
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focus of collaboration. For example, an alliance marked as “gene therapy” 
transfers the resources needed for application of DNA for treatment of 
diseases. RECAP’s alliance technology classification contains 53 distinct 
categories; two were for combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening.  
I then surveyed industry experts to classify each of the 51 categories of 
technologies as “reinforced by the discontinuity”, “challenged by the 
discontinuity” or “unaffected by the discontinuity”. I treated the categories 
relating to combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening as requiring 
new resources. A search of published papers on combinatorial chemistry and 
high-throughput screening in the 1990s identified 30 experts who had 
witnessed the technological discontinuity in the 1990s, to whom I emailed a 
survey. Six scientists responded. Respondents classified the technologies into 
reinforced, challenged, and unaffected by the discontinuity. Cohen’s kappa of 
0.30 (p<0.001) indicated agreement among the respondents. Any value 
between 0.21 and 0.40 indicates a fair agreement over the classifications 
(Landis and Koch 1977). The 51 categories were broadly distributed across the 
three types of resource impact. I used the classification of the technologies to 
indicate each alliance as being for challenged, reinforced, new or unaffected 
resources (Appendix A). 
Formation and disbandment of alliances for challenged resources. 
Among the 51 types of technologies, three technologies were classified as 
being challenged by the discontinuity. I counted occurrence of formation and 
disbandment of such alliances in each year for each focal firm. 
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Formation and disbandment of alliances for reinforced resources. 
Among the 51 types of technologies, 13 were classified as being reinforced by 
the discontinuity. I calculated the number of such alliances formed in each 
year by each focal firm. Similarly, the number of such alliances disbanded in 
each year was calculated. 
Formation of alliances for new resources. For this variable, I counted 
the number of alliances formed for combinatorial chemistry and high-
throughput screening in each year by each firm.  
In addition, I used three other dependent variables for further analyses. 
The respondents identified 31 types of technologies as being “unaffected” by 
the 1995 discontinuity. I calculated formation of alliances for unaffected 
resources and included them in one of the models. The expectation is that 
formation of alliances for this type of resources is not affected by the 
technological discontinuity in 1995. 
A major technological development in the biopharmaceutical industry 
in the early 2000s was the mapping of the human genome. Though early drafts 
of the human genome map were released in 2001, pharmaceutical firms had 
been collaborating on the development and use of this map and data before 
then. To tease out the effects of the increase in the number of alliances for 
genomics resources on alliance portfolio reconfiguration, I excluded them 
from the rest of the alliances to avoid the increase in their formations 
confound the results. I included the formation of alliances for genomics 
resources in a separate model. Respondents identified four types of 
technologies as genomics technologies. 
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I also calculated the total number of formations and disbandment of all 
types of alliances in a portfolio of a focal firm as overall reconfiguration, 
which I included in the analysis. 
Explanatory Variables. My main explanatory variables are year dummies to 
capture changes in alliance formation, disbandment and overall portfolio 
reconfiguration. The dummy variable “Years 1990-1994” indicates the years 
before the discontinuity. Single year dummies indicate the years 1996 to 2000. 
The year 1995 is the year of the discontinuity, and served as the omitted 
category for dummy variables. Among the dependent variables introduced 
above, two variables are used as explanatory variables in the models for 
testing H4a and H4b.   
Control Variables. R&D intensity, measured as firm’s R&D expenses divided 
by sales, controlled for firm capabilities, which could have affected alliance 
formation and disbandment (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Rothaermel and 
Alexandre 2009).  Sales (logged) and firm age accounted for firms’ size, 
resource availability and experience. R&D intensity and Sales jointly had 
25.80% missing data points. Reeb and Koh (2013) showed that firms may 
intentionally refuse to disclose their R&D data. Consequently, missing data 
points could result in biased estimations. Therefore, I used multiple-
imputation (Rubin 1987) to fill out the missing data for R&D intensity and 
Sales data. 
Dummy variables indicating firms’ countries of origin and primary 
NAIC codes (at the six-digit level) control for possible differences in the 
likelihood of establishing and disbanding alliances across countries and areas 
of specialization. These variables were extracted from the Osiris database. 
40 
 
I controlled for the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals 
in a year undertaken by each firm because these may substitute for alliances 
(Dyer et al. 2004, Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002).  I obtained this variable 
from RECAP. The number of clinical trials filed by a firm in each year 
controls for the extent of a firm’s involvement in drug discovery and for its 
resources. This data was obtained from the US National Institute of Health 
(NIH) database (http://clinicaltrials.gov/) and from clinical trials data from 
RECAP. The number of patents applied for in each year controlled for the 
possession of technological competencies, which may affect each firm’s need 
for alliances and its desirability as a partner (Ahuja 2000b). Finally, the 
number of total ties in 1994, counted the number of alliances formed in 1994 
or formed before 1994 but continued to exist by 1994. This variable controlled 
for the size of each firm’s portfolio before the discontinuity, which could 
determine how many alliances would be disbanded and formed following the 
discontinuity. Also, the extent to which firms are connected to other firms 
could affect their status and the likelihood of being chosen as partners (Gulati 





Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
N= 2,440, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Overall reconfiguration 2.55 4.66                            
 
2. Termination of  alliances for 
challenged  resources 
0.11 0.47 0.56***                          
 
3. Formation of alliances for 
challenged resources 
0.28 0.82 0.66*** 0.45***                        
 
4. Formation of alliances for 
reinforced resources 
0.58 1.35 0.77*** 0.43*** 0.80***                      
 
5. Termination of alliances for 
reinforced resources 
0.23 0.74 0.70*** 0.78*** 0.46*** 0.52***                    
 
6. Formation of alliances  for 
new  resources 
0.19 0.74 0.56*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.30***                  
 
7. Formation of alliances for 
unaffected resources 
0.72 1.49 0.73*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.36*** 0.27***                
 
8. Formation of alliances for 
genomics resources 
0.30 0.94 0.68*** 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.50***              
 
9. R&D Intensity t-1 14.95 48.42 -0.05** -0.04** -0.05** -0.05** -0.04** -0.05** -0.04* -0.04**            
 
10. Ln(Sales) t-1 9.49 3.10 0.45*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.30*** -0.27***          
 
11. Number of M&A deals t-1 0.15 0.53 0.47*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.28*** -0.03 0.31***        
 
12. Number of clinical trials t-1 0.40 1.97 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.30*** -0.02 0.25*** 0.26***      
 
13. Number of patents t-1 8.42 23.86 0.64*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.48*** -0.04* 0.50*** 0.34*** 0.35***    
 
14. Number of total ties in 1994 2.74 4.70 0.78*** 0.41*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.61*** 0.57*** -0.07*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.68***  
 
15. Firm age 21.87 30.35 0.35*** 0.23*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.23*** -0.05** 0.60*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.48*** 0.36***  
Minimum   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 0 0 0 1 




Two types of statistical methods tested the hypotheses. First, random effects 
Poisson regression models tested all hypotheses. Second, difference-in-
difference (DD) based on propensity score matching provided further testing. I 
used diff command in Stata for the DD analyses (Villa 2011). 
The advantage of a DD approach is that it answers questions of 
counterfactual nature and controls for unobserved heterogeneity (Angrist and 
Pischke 2008). In this essay I argued that firms’ alliance formation, 
disbandment, and overall portfolio reconfiguration increases following a 
technological discontinuity. But, it is possible that some firms in the sample 
had high propensity for alliance formation and disbandment even before the 
discontinuity. Since this propensity is latent (i.e., unobservable) and cannot be 
included in the model, the estimates of the Poisson model could be 
confounded by endogeneity and, therefore, asymptotically inconsistent 
(Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
The ideal way to deal with this issue is to compare the post-
discontinuity value of the outcome variables of interest for a firm when it is 
affected by the discontinuity after 1995 with the values for the same firm 
when it is not affected by the discontinuity after 1995. Such an experiment 
would answer the counterfactual questions such as “how would have a firm 
affected by the discontinuity after 1995 reconfigured its alliance portfolio had 
it not been affected by the discontinuity after 1995?” However, such an 
experiment is impractical.  
A DD analysis, in conjunction with propensity score matching 
compares the post-discontinuity and pre-discontinuity alliance formation or 
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disbandment for firms for each type of resource (treatment group) with that of 
firms less affected by the discontinuity (control group). The control group 
should be as similar as possible to the treatment group, except for the effects 
of the treatment (i.e., the discontinuity).   
DD analysis calculates the effect of treatment on the outcome variable 
of interest (also known as average treatment on treated (ATT)) using the 
following formula: 
ܣܶܶ ൌ ሺܻ௣௢௦௧௧௥௘௔௧ െ ܻ௣௢௦௧௖௢௡௧௥௢௟ሻ െ ሺܻ௣௥௘௧௥௘௔௧ െ ܻ௣௥௘௖௢௡௧௥௢௟ሻ 
 ܻis the average of the outcome variable of interest (e.g., formation of 
alliances), measured across two groups (treated vs. controlled) and two time-
periods (post-discontinuity vs. pre- discontinuity).  DD analysis deducts the 
control group’s post-discontinuity outcome variable (ܻ௣௢௦௧௖௢௡௧௥௢௟) from the 
treatment group’s post-discontinuity outcome variable (ܻ௣௢௦௧௧௥௘௔௧). Then, it 
repeats the same procedure for the pre-discontinuity period. Finally, it 
calculates the difference between the two differences to determine the net 
effect of receiving the treatment (ATT). 
In this way, the DD estimate removes the pre-discontinuity difference 
between the two groups. It is important to remove this difference because the 
increase in Y could have been not only due to receiving the treatment, but also 
due to the fact that even before the discontinuity treatment group’s Y was 
larger than the control group’s Y. In other words, it was possible that the 
treatment group had greater tendency for formation or disbandment of 
alliances even before the discontinuity. Therefore, observed differences 
between these firms and other groups following the discontinuity may have 
44 
 
been due to the greater propensity to form and disband alliances, rather than 
the discontinuity. A DD procedure nullifies such a possibility. 
In a DD estimate the control group members should be as similar to the 
treatment groups as possible, except for receiving the treatment. I used 
propensity scope matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and employed the 
kernel-based method (Heckman et al. 1998). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2.3a provides the results of the Poisson model for hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
H2a, H2b, and H3. It also presents the results of three additional models that 
help clarify reconfiguration and the industry dynamics.  Model 1 evaluates 
overall reconfiguration (summation of formation and disbandment of all types 
of alliances) from 1990 to 2000, with the year of the discontinuity 1995 being 
the omitted category. The coefficient of the dummy variable “Years 1990-
1994” is negative and significant (b= -0.18; p<0.01); in contrast, the 
coefficients of the post-discontinuity years dummies (i.e. 1996 to 2000) are 
positive and significant (p<0.01 for all years). In order to test whether the 
coefficients of the years 1996 through 2000 are greater than the coefficient of 
“Years 1990-1994”, I ran separate χ2 tests. The χ2 tests showed that the 
coefficients of the years 1996 to 2000 are significantly greater than the 
coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01 for all years). These results show 
that the likelihood of overall alliance portfolio reconfiguration increased after 
the technological discontinuity. Next, I discuss the results of the hypotheses on 
the disbandment and formation of alliances for different types of resources, 
which underlie the overall reconfiguration. 
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Table 2.3a Random Effect Poisson Estimation of Disbandment and Formation of Alliances (H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b, and H3) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Overall  
Reconfiguration 
H1a (+): Disbandment of  
alliances for  
challenged  
resources 









of alliances for 
reinforced  
resources 
H3(+): Formation of  
alliances for  
new  
resources 






























































































































































































































































N 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 
Log-Likelihood -3820.20 -579.00 -1156.30 -1891.80 -1058.10 -790.20 -2153.00 -1088.40 
Chi-squared 1146.8*** 277.00*** 217.90*** 334.80*** 361.40*** 148.80*** 213.10*** 147.40*** 
Notes. The change in the number of alliances formed or disbanded following the discontinuity is determined by comparing the coefficients of the “Years 1990-1994” with 
each of the coefficients of year dummies 1996-2000 using Chi-squared tests. 
Country and NAIC dummies included but not reported 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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H1a proposes that disbandment of alliances for challenged resources 
will increase following the technological discontinuity. In Model 2 the 
coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative, but non-significant (b=-0.31, 
p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Year 1996” is positive, but non-significant (b= 
0.48, p=n.s.). But, the χ2 test shows that the coefficient of “Year 1996” is 
statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). The 
coefficients of the years 1997 to 2000 are positive and significant (p<0.01 for 
all years), and χ2 tests showed that all are greater than the coefficient of “Years 
1990-1994” (p<0.01 for all years). These results support H1a, showing that 
following the technological discontinuity the likelihood of disbanding 
alliances for challenged resources increased.  
While the disbandment likelihood of alliances for challenged resources 
increased following the discontinuity, it did not grow continuously. A χ2 test 
showed that while the coefficient of “Year 1997” is statistically greater than 
the coefficient of “Year 1996” (p<0.1), the equality of the coefficients of 
“Year 1998” and “Year 1997” cannot be rejected. Similar results are found for 
the equality of the coefficients of “Year 1999” and “Year 1998” and the 
equality of the coefficients of “Year 2000” and “Year 1999”. In sum, the 
likelihood of disbanding alliances for challenged resources increased in 1997 
over 1996, but thereafter remained steady. 
Model 3 shows the results of the test for H1b, on the formation of 
alliances for challenged resources.  The coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is 
negative and non-significant (b=-0.13, p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Year 1996” 
is positive and non-significant (b=0.13, p=n.s.). Also, a χ2 test showed that 
their equality cannot be rejected. 
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In Model 3 the coefficient for “Year 1997” is positive and significant 
(b=0.30, p<0.1) and statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-
1994” (p<0.01). Also, the coefficient of the dummy variables of 1998 through 
2000 are all positive, significant and greater than the coefficient of “Years 
1990-1994” (p<0.01 for years 1998 through 2000). These results confirm H1b, 
which states that the likelihood of forming alliances for challenged resources 
increases following a technological discontinuity. Similar to the disbandment 
of alliances for challenged resources, χ2 tests showed an increase in the 
formation likelihood of alliances for challenged resources in 1997 over 1996, 
but a steady state subsequently. 
Model 4 shows the results of the test for H2a which predicts that the 
likelihood of forming alliances for reinforced resources increases following a 
technological discontinuity. Results in Model 4 show that the coefficient of 
“Years 1990-1994” is positive, but non-significant (b=0.07, p=n.s.). The 
coefficient of “Year 1996” is positive and significant (b=0.30, p<0.05). A χ2 
test shows that the coefficient of “Year 1996” is greater than the coefficient of 
“Years 1990-1994” (p<0.05).  Next, the coefficient of “Year 1997” is positive 
and significant (b=0.34, p<0.01). A χ2 test shows that the coefficient of “Year 
1997” is greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). The 
coefficients of “Year 1998”, “Year 1999”, and “Year 2000” are positive and 
significant (p<0.01) and statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 
1990-1994”. Together, these results support H2a which predicts that following 
the discontinuity the likelihood of formation of alliances for reinforced 
resources increases. Also, χ2 tests showed that while the  likelihood of  
formation of alliances for reinforced resources increased following the 
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technological discontinuity of 1995, the likelihood of formation remained 
stable throughput the post-discontinuity period (except for a marginal increase 
from 1999 to 2000). 
Model 5 presents the results of the test for H2b, which predicts that the 
likelihood of disbandment of alliances for reinforced resources decreases 
following a technological discontinuity. The coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” 
is negative and non-significant (b=-0.12, p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Year 
1996” is positive and non-significant (b=0.34, p=n.s.). But, a χ2 test showed 
that the coefficient of “Year 1996” is statistically greater than the coefficient 
of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). 
Next, the coefficients of “Year 1997”, “Year 1998”, “Year 1999”, and 
“Year 2000” are all positive and significant (p<0.01), and statistically greater 
than the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). These results reject H2b 
by showing that the likelihood of disbanding alliances for reinforced resources 
did not decrease following the technological discontinuity. In fact, the results 
show the opposite, that the likelihood of disbanding alliances increased.  
One interpretation of the increased disbandment likelihood of alliances 
following the technological discontinuity is that alliance-specific assets 
invested in alliances lose value, when value of resources provided by the 
alliances changes. Alliance specific-assets are resources dedicated to an 
alliance by partners to enhance communication, coordination (Gulati and 
Singh 1998) and, consequently, value creation and rent generation (Dyer and 
Singh 1998). Following the reinforcement of the resources and increase in 
their value, firms may revaluate their partnerships for these resources. The 
alliance-specific assets from the pre-discontinuity period lose their specificity 
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and, hence, their value for rent generation following a change in the value of 
the resources exchanged through the alliances. Therefore, firms may be more 
likely to disband alliances for reinforced resources following the technological 
discontinuity. 
Also, following reinforcement of the resources and increase in their 
value, partners may re-examine their partnerships that provide these resources. 
With the increase in the importance and value of the resources, the 
appropriability risk increases too. Therefore, firms may look to replace the 
current alliances with new alliances with new governance mechanisms that are 
more effective in curbing opportunism, resolving the potential conflicts and 
distributing the rents between the partners (Williamson 1991).Therefore, firms 
may be more likely to disband alliances for resources reinforced by a 
technological discontinuity. 
Model 6 shows the results for the test of H3, which predicts that the 
likelihood of forming alliances for new resources will increase following the 
discontinuity. The coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative and 
significant (b=-0.55, p<0.01). And, the coefficient of “Year 1996” is positive 
but non-significant (b=0.23, p=n.s.). A χ2 test showed that the coefficient of 
“Year 1996” is statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” 
(p<0.01).  
Next, the coefficient of “Year 1997” is positive and significant 
(b=0.63, p<0.01). And, a χ2 test shows that that this coefficient is greater than 
the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). Similarly, the coefficients of 
“Year 1998”, “Year 1999” and “Year 2000” are statistically greater than the 
coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01), despite being non-significant. 
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These results support H3 indicating that following the discontinuity the 
likelihood of forming alliances for new resources increases.  Also, a χ2 test 
showed that the likelihood of forming alliances for new resources, though 
significantly higher than in the pre-discontinuity period, declined from 1997 to 
1998 and remained unchanged until the end of the study period. 
To test that the above results are not confounded by endogeneity, I 
repeated the above analyses with DD analyses (Tables 2.3b to 2.3f). I divided 
the sample into two groups: a treatment group of firms that would have been 
more severely affected by the technological discontinuity and a control group 
of relatively unaffected firms. I divided firms by their activity in the drug 
development process. Firms active in drug development would have been 
affected by the technological discontinuity because of its impact on drug 
development. The discontinuity would have altered the value of resources of 
firms active in drug development more severely than the value of resources of 
firms less active in drug development. I measured activity in drug 
development through firms’ clinical trials. Firms were classified as treatment 
group --affected by the discontinuity -- if they conducted at least one clinical 
trial before 1995, while those that did not conduct any clinical trial before 
1995 were classified as the control group.  The analysis used the same control 
variables for kernel-based matching that were used as control variables in the 
Poisson models. 
Table 2.3b reports the DD analysis for H1a, which predicts that the 
likelihood of disbanding alliances for challenged resources will increase. The 
results show that the control group and the treatment group were not different 
in terms of disbanding alliances for challenged resources before the 
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discontinuity (0.04, p=n.s.). However, the firms with clinical trial before 1995 
(i.e., the treatment group) were more likely to disband such alliances after 
1995 (0.46, p<0.01). In turn, the net effect of the discontinuity on disbandment 
likelihood of alliances for challenged resources is positive and significant 
(0.42; p<0.01). This result implies that the observed effect in Model 2 of Table 
2.3a was not confounded by the possible tendency of the sampled firms to 
increasingly disband alliances prior to the discontinuity. The DD results 
support the view that the increase in the likelihood of disbanding alliances for 
challenged resources was due to the incidence of the technological 
discontinuity, providing further support for H1a. 
Table 2.3c reports the DD analysis results for H1b, which predicts that 
the likelihood of forming alliances for challenged resources will increase 
following a technological discontinuity. The definition of the groups is similar 
to Table 2.3b. The DD results (0.55, p<0.01) show that firms whose resources 
were challenged more severely by the discontinuity were more likely to form 
alliances for challenged resources following the discontinuity, providing 
further support for H1b.
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 Table 2.3b DD Estimates of Disbandment of Alliances for Challenged resources (H1a (+)) 
1990-1994 1996-2000 
Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference Control Treated Difference
Difference-in-
Difference 
Disbandment of alliances 
for challenged resources 
0.01 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.53 0.46*** 0.42*** 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
N 692 164   1045 232     
Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.42***) indicates that following the discontinuity the treatment 
group’s disbandment of alliances for challenged resources was greater than the control group’s, providing further support for H1a. 
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial before 1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with at least one clinical trial before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of patents, 
number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2.3c DD Estimates of Formation of Alliances for Challenged Resources (H1b (+)) 
1990-1994 1996-2000 
Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference Control Treated Difference
Difference-in-
Difference 
Formation of alliances 
for challenged 
resources 
0.04 0.45 0.41*** 0.18 1.14 0.96*** 0.55*** 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
N 692 164   1045 232     
Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.55***) indicates that following the discontinuity the treatment 
group’s formation of alliances for challenged resources was greater than the control group’s, providing further support for H1b. 
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial before 1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with at least one clinical trial before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of patents, 
number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Similarly, the DD estimates reported in Table 2.3d (0.60, p<0.01) 
further confirm the results of the Poisson estimation for H2a, which predicts 
that following a technological discontinuity the likelihood of forming alliances 
for resources whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity will increase. 
The results of the DD estimate in Table 2.3e (0.65, p<0.01) confirm 
the results of the Poisson estimation in Table 2.3a that showed the opposite of 
the prediction made in H2b. Finally, the results of the DD analysis in Table 
2.3f support H3, showing that the event of the technological discontinuity in 
1995 sparked formation of alliances for new resources (0.44, p<0.01). 
These results show that following a technological discontinuity firms 
are more likely to disband (H1a) and form (H1b) alliances for challenged 
resources. They also show that firms are more likely to form alliances for 
resources reinforced by the technological discontinuity (H2a), and for the new 
resources (H3). However, the results reject H2b and show that firms are more 




Table 2.3d DD Estimates of Formation of Alliances for Reinforced Resources (H2a (+)) 
1990-1994 1996-2000 
Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference Control Treated Difference
Difference-in-
Difference 
Formation of alliances 
for reinforced 
resources 
0.12 1.08 0.95*** 0.41 1.97 1.55*** 0.60*** 
(0.03) (1.16) (1.16) (0.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) 
N 692 164   1045 232     
Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.60***) indicates that following the discontinuity the treatment 
group’s formation of alliances for reinforced resources was greater than the control group’s, providing further support for H2a. 
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial before 1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with at least one clinical trial before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of 
patents, number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2.3e DD Estimates of Disbandment of Alliances for Reinforced Resources (H2b (-)) 
1990-1994 1996-2000 






0.04 0.19 0.15* 0.17 0.97 0.80*** 0.65*** 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) 
N 692 164   1045 232     
Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.65***) indicates that following the discontinuity the treatment 
group’s disbandment of alliances for reinforced resources was greater than the control group’s, rejecting H2b. 
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial before 1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with at least one clinical trial before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of 
patents, number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 













Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.44***) indicates that following the discontinuity the treatment 
group’s formation of alliances for new resources was greater than the control group’s, providing further support for H3. 
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial before 1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with at least one clinical trial before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of 
patents, number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 










Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference Control Treated Difference
Difference-in-
Difference 
Formation of alliances 
for new resources 
0.02 0.35 0.33*** 0.14 0.91 0.77*** 0.44 *** 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) 
N 692 164   1045 232     
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While some resources may be challenged or reinforced by a 
technological discontinuity, some remain unaffected. Model 7 in Table 2.3a 
shows the results of the Poisson estimation for the formation of alliances for 
unaffected resources.  The χ2 tests show that the estimated coefficients of the 
years 1996 to 1998 are not statistically different from the estimated coefficient 
of the variable “Years 1990-1994”. The first increase took place in 1999 
(p<0.05) followed by another increase in 2000 (p<0.01). The results show that 
the likelihood of forming alliances for unaffected resources was not influenced 
by the discontinuity of 1995. The increase in 1999 also does not seem to be 
meaningfully tied to the discontinuity of 1995 as there is a 4-year gap between 
them.  
As indicated before, another technological discontinuity in the form of 
genome mapping took place in the early 2000s. Publication of the early draft 
of the genome map was an endogenous technological discontinuity in the 
biopharmaceutical industry because multiple private and public institutions 
within the industry worked together on that over several years. The pattern of 
the increase in the formation and disbandment of such alliances could have 
confounded the results. To avoid this confounding the results, I classified the 
alliances that transferred resources needed for genomics research into a 
separate category. Model 8 repeats the analysis for the formation of alliances 
for genomics resources. Results show that there were major alliance formation 
activities among firms for genomics resources before the discontinuity of the 
genome map in 2001. These results suggest that, unlike the discontinuity of 
1995, the genome map discontinuity of the year 2001 may be endogenously 
shaped by the extensive collaborations among biopharmaceutical firms.  
57 
 
  Some of the control variables of the models in Table 2.3a are worth 
noting. “Ln (Sales)” is positively related to the likelihood of overall 
reconfiguration, formation and disbandment of alliances across several 
models, implying that bigger firms are more likely to undertake formation and 
disbandment of alliances. The number of total ties before the discontinuity is 
positively related to the alliance formation and disbandment likelihood in all 
models, suggesting that the degree to which firms are connected to others may 
guide their reconfiguration likelihood (Powell et al. 2005). R&D intensity and 
number of patents did not have an impact, possibly because such investments 
affect and reflect long term capabilities, and do not shield firms from sudden 
technological discontinuities.  M&A deals increase alliance formation 
likelihood, suggesting a complementary effect, and disbandment likelihood, 
suggesting a substitution effect. 
  Table 2.4 reports the results of the tests for H4a and H4b. H4a predicts 
that the formation of alliances for reinforced resources will increase 
disbandment of alliances for challenged resources after the discontinuity. 
Therefore, I ran the model only for post-discontinuity time interval (i.e., 1996 
to 2000), with the number of disbanded alliances for challenged resources as 
the dependent variable. Model 9 shows the result of the test for H4a. The 
coefficient of the alliances formed for reinforced resources is positive and 
significant (b=0.16, p<0.01). The explanatory variable is lagged for two years. 
Similar result was found with a 1-year lag, but not with a 3-year lag. Thus, the 
results support H4a. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for formation of 
alliances for new resources in Model 10 is positive but non-significant 
(b=0.02, p=n.s.). Therefore, H4b is not supported. In other words, formation of 
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alliances for new resources, in itself, does not cause disbandment of alliances 
for challenged resources by consuming limited resources of firms. 
Nevertheless, firms’ response to emergence of a technological discontinuity 
and formation of alliances for new resources could trigger second-order 
changes in alliance portfolios- well beyond the primary effect of the 

































Table 2.4 Random Effect Poisson Estimation of the Impact of Formation of 
Alliances for Reinforced and New Resources on the Disbandment of Alliances 
for Challenged Resources (H4a & H4b) 










H4a (+): Formation of 
alliances for reinforced 
resources t-2 
0.16*** 
(0.03)              
             
H4b (+): Formation of 







Year 1996 -0.68*** -0.81***  
  (0.25) (0.26) 
Year 1997 -0.32 -0.48**   
  (0.24) (0.24) 
Year 1998 -0.22 -0.27   
  (0.21) (0.21) 
Year 1999 -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.19) (0.19) 
R&D intensity t-1 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln(Sales) t-1 0.20*** 0.18***  
  (0.04) (0.05) 
Number of M&A deals t-1 0.11** 0.16**   
  (0.06) (0.07) 
Number of clinical trials t-1 0.00 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of patents t-1 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of total ties in 
1994 0.02 0.05** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 




Constant -4.35*** -4.30*** 
  (0.44) (0.52) 
N 1226 1226 
Log-Likelihood -442.60 -449.70 
Chi-Squared 465.20*** 196.30 






 The VIFs of the variables in the models of Table 2.3a and Table 2.4 are 
well below the threshold criterion of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity does not 
seem to have confounded the estimation results. 
One issue that might arise in the studies involving shock relates to how 
exposed to the discontinuity the firms are. All of the reasoning, discussions 
and the interpretations of the results hinge on the assumption that the firms 
were directly exposed to the discontinuity.  Stated differently, if the firms in 
the sample did not face the discontinuity, I could not claim any causality. This 
is an important issue that has been under-emphasized by previous studies of 
technological discontinuities.  
To test for such a possibility, I used DD estimation and divided the 
firms into two groups: a control group comprising firms with no clinical trial 
before the discontinuity and no tie to the firms dedicated to development of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening; and, a treatment 
group including the firms with no clinical trials before the discontinuity, but 
with at least one alliance tie to the firms dedicated to development of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening.  Therefore, the 
treatment that the treatment group has received is the discontinuity. The 
criterion of not having any clinical trial before 1995 guarantees that this test is 
examining only direct exposure to the discontinuity and not the alteration of  
the resource-bases of the firms. The outcome variable is formation of alliances 
for new resources. The control group firms are the firms whose resources are 
not seriously altered by the discontinuity and had not been seriously exposed 
to the discontinuity before 1995. The treatment group firms, while not 
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impacted strongly by the 1995 discontinuity, had alliances that could have 
informed them about the emergence of the discontinuity.  
Table 2.5 shows the result of the DD estimation for formation of 
alliances for new resources. As expected, the two groups did not differ in 
terms of likelihood of forming alliances for new resources before the 
discontinuity (0.11, p=n.s.). However, after the discontinuity the group that 
was directly exposed to discontinuity was more likely to form alliances for 
new resources (0.50, p<0.01). The DD estimate is also positive and significant 
(0.39, p<0.01). These results suggest that the discontinuity of 1995 triggered 
formation of alliances for new resources mainly among the firms that were 
directly exposed to the discontinuity. 
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Table 2.5 DD Estimates of Formation of Alliances for New Resources  
1990-1994 1996-2000 
Outcome Variable Control Treated Difference Control Treated Difference
Difference-in-
Difference 
Formation of Alliances 
for New Resources 
0.01 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.56 0.50*** 0.39*** 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) 
N 608 64   907 81     
Notes. The positive and significant value of difference-in-difference (0.39***) indicates that firms that were directly exposed to the 
discontinuity via alliances with combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening firms before the discontinuity formed more alliances 
for new resources following the discontinuity.  
Control Group: Firms with no clinical trial and with no alliance with any combinatorial chemistry or high-throughput screening firm before 
1995 
Treatment Group: Firms with no clinical trial but with at least one alliance with a combinatorial chemistry or high-throughput screening 
firm before 1995 
Matching based on the following variables: R&D intensity, Ln (Sales), number of M&A deals, number of clinical trials, number of patents, 
number of total ties in 1994, firm age, country of origin, NAIC codes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In other words, even among the firms whose resources were not 
significantly affected by the discontinuity, the ones who were directly exposed 
to the discontinuity were more responsive by forming alliances for new 
resources of combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening. This 
experiment increases the confidence in the discontinuity being the main reason 
for observing sudden reconfiguration of the alliance portfolios after 1995. 
Table 2.6 provides a summary of the results of the hypotheses’ tests. 
Table 2.6 Summary of the Hypotheses and the Findings 
Hypotheses Poisson DD 
H1a: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of 
disbanding alliances for resources 
whose value is challenged by the 
discontinuity will increase. 
Supported Supported 
H1b: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of forming 
alliances for resources whose value is 
challenged by the discontinuity will 
increase. 
Supported Supported 
H2a: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of forming 
alliances for resources whose value is 
reinforced by the discontinuity will 
increase. 
Supported Supported 
H2b: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of 
disbanding alliances for resources 
whose value is reinforced by the 




H3: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the likelihood of forming 
alliances for new resources will 
increase. 
Supported Supported 
H4a: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the more alliances for 
reinforced resources that firms form, the 
more alliances for challenged resources 
that they will disband. 
Supported  
H4b: Following a technological 
discontinuity, the more alliances for 
new resources that firms form, the more 
alliances for challenged resources that 







I replaced the Poisson model with negative binomial models, to evaluate the 
effects of possible overdispersion of the dependent variables. Results were 
similar, except for the test of H4a in Model 9 of Table 2.4 where the model did 
not converge.  Next, I checked if the imputation of missing R&D intensity and 
sales data affected model estimations. Results of the models ran on non-
imputed data were similar. 
 Though, there is strong evidence that the technological discontinuity 
occurred in 1995, I replicated the regression and the DD analyses using 1994 
as the year of the discontinuity. The results were similar.  
Next, I used two-stage least-square (2SLS) regressions using 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to check for possible inconsistency of 
the estimated coefficient of  the variable “number of total ties in 1994” and its 
possible effect on the estimated coefficients of the year dummy variables. The 
number of total ties in 1994 is likely to be correlated with the unobserved 
firm-level variables in the error terms such as propensity to reconfigure in the 
face of discontinuity because firms with more alliances are likely to form new 
and disband current alliances. This may lead to endogeneity of the variable 
“number of total ties in 1994”.  
I chose “total current assets in 1993” as the instrumental variable. This 
variable is correlated with the variable “number of total ties in 1994” (r=0.52, 
p<0.01). However, “total current assets in 1993” is unlikely to be correlated 
with the tendency to reconfigure after the 1995 technological discontinuity. 
The results of the 2SLS-GMM models are similar to the results of the Poisson 
and DD estimations. However, in the model with “formation of alliances for 
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reinforced resources” as the dependent variable the validity of the instrumental 
variable was not satisfied. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study is an answer to the call to examine the evolution of alliance 
portfolios (Wassmer 2010). I examined how biopharmaceutical firms 
reconfigured their alliance portfolios by forming and disbanding alliances for 
different types of resources that were affected differently by the technological 
discontinuity posed by combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening.  Results show that firms respond to technological discontinuities by 
reconfiguring their alliance portfolios, by forming new alliances and 
disbanding current alliances. 
Firms are more likely to disband alliances for resources whose value is 
challenged by the discontinuity. The challenge to the value of resources 
reduces the value of alliances that provide these resources, increasing their 
disbandment likelihood. Furthermore, firms are likely to find new partners to 
obtain upgraded challenged resources because current partners may lack the 
specific resources required. Even if the current partners have the ability to 
provide the upgraded resources, firms are still likely to disband current 
alliances because resources specific to these alliances possibly lose their 
specificity under altered conditions (Dyer and Singh 1998).   
 Firms are also more likely to form alliances for challenged resources 
after the discontinuity. These resources, though challenged, do not lose their 
entire value. Firms, therefore, look for partners who can help them upgrade 
these resources, leading to increase in formation likelihood of alliances for 
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challenged resources. However, there was a 2-year lag between the 
technological discontinuity of 1995 and the first increase in the formation 
likelihood of alliances for challenged resources. Formation of alliances for 
challenged resources may hinge on the availability of the partners who can 
help firms upgrade their resources (Adner and Kapoor 2010, Castrogiovanni 
1991, Park and Mezias 2005). Firms may only be able to find suitable partners 
for upgrading their challenged resources after a delay, possibly after 
uncertainties on the resource needs and potential partners’ capabilities are 
resolved. 
 Next, the results showed that firms are more likely to form alliances 
for resources whose value is reinforced by the discontinuity. The 
reinforcement of the value of resources increases the value of the partnerships 
through which they are obtained, leading to increase in the formation 
likelihood of alliances for reinforced resources. The potential to provide 
resources may increase the firm’s attractiveness to partners leading to greater 
likelihood of forming alliances.  
Contrary to the initial predictions, firms were more likely to disband 
alliances for reinforced resources. This result seems counterintuitive because 
the value of such alliances should increase following the technological 
discontinuity, leading to decrease in their disbandment likelihood.  
One interpretation of the evidence on the increased disbandment 
likelihood of alliances could be that following the technological discontinuity 
the alliance-specific assets deployed by the partners to communicate and 
coordinate their activities (Gulati and Singh 1998) may lose their specificity 
and, consequently, their rent-generating potential (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
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Assets deployed for coordination and communication in an alliance can be a 
source of competitive advantage and rent-generation as long as they are well-
tuned to the partners and the resources being exchanged between them (Dyer 
and Singh 1998). Therefore, the value of the alliance-specific assets is likely to 
reduce following an increase in the value of the resources that were initially 
exchanged between the partners. This could lead firms to re-examine and 
disband their alliances for the reinforced resources and form new alliances for 
such resources with specific assets that are tuned to the new conditions.   
Also, with the increase in the importance of these resources, the pre-
discontinuity governance and contractual structure of such alliances may need 
to be re-examined. Hence, firms may look for replacing the current alliances 
with new alliances with new governance mechanisms that are more effective 
in restricting opportunism, resolving the potential conflicts and assigning 
incentives to the partners (Ariño and Reuer 2004, Reuer and Ariño 2007, 
Williamson 1991).Therefore, firms may be more likely to disband alliances for 
resources reinforced by a technological discontinuity. 
The results also show that firms were more likely to form alliances for 
access to the new resources following the discontinuity. The emergence of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening technology in 1995 
led firms to form alliances for accessing the new resources that could 
potentially enable them to develop therapeutic compounds at a fraction of the 
cost of traditional synthetic methods.   
  Finally, the results showed that greater formation of alliances for 
reinforced resources could cause more disbandment of alliances for challenged 
resources because as firms add more alliances to their portfolios there remain 
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fewer resources to be spent on maintenance of their current alliances (Ocasio 
1997, Singh and Mitchell 1996). Formation of multiple ties spreads the 
resources of the firms thin; and, consequently, the likelihood of disbandment 
of their existing alliances increases. 
 These results suggest that firms actively manage their alliances as a 
portfolio to meet their resource needs. Therefore, evolution of alliance 
portfolios is likely to be shaped by how well these portfolios satisfy firms’ 
resource requirements. 
This study contributes to the literature on alliance portfolios in several 
ways. First, it addresses the evolution of alliance portfolios and shows that 
firms can actively reconfigure the structure of their alliance portfolios. This 
finding is important, particularly, as the current literature on evolution of 
alliances implies that their evolution is primarily driven by path-dependency 
or life-cycle stages (Dwyer et al. 1987, Jap and Anderson 2007, Lavie and 
Singh 2012, Rosenkopf and Padula 2008, Uzzi 1996). Given that alliance 
portfolios consist of multiple alliance ties, the implicit conclusion would be 
that alliance portfolios, too, should evolve merely through internal processes 
such as path dependency. This conclusion, however, raises the question as to 
whether alliance portfolios can be reconfigured in response to a technological 
discontinuity that alters the mix of resources that are needed for firms’ 
competitive advantage. This study addresses this question by showing that 
firms form and disband alliances following a technological discontinuity that 
alters the value of their resource-bases, indicating that alliance portfolios 
evolve through firms adding and removing alliances in reaction to external 
stimuli, rather than through life cycle changes of individual alliances. 
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Second, this study shows that firms actively manage alliance 
portfolios, such that alliances in a portfolio interact with each other; the 
formation of new alliances is related to the disbandment of current alliances. 
These results support the value of studying alliances from a portfolio 
perspective, which may provide a more complete picture than from studying 
them as independent ties. For example, the research on alliance survival and 
termination (e.g., Lunnan and Haugland 2008) has studied alliances as 
independent ties. Overlooking the fact that firms’ limited capacity to maintain 
multiple alliances could contribute to their instability may lead to bias in 
estimation of the antecedents of alliances’ survival.  
Third, this study improves our understanding of how technological 
discontinuities affect alliance portfolio reconfiguration. As portfolios primarily 
represent means for firms to overcome their resource shortages, radical 
exogenous changes that alter resource requirements are likely to alter the value 
of alliances and of alliance portfolios. This study investigates the details of 
how technological discontinuities affect different types of resources, and how 
this varying impact affects portfolio reconfiguration.  More broadly, results are 
consistent with the view that firms can and do react to major external threats 
by modifying their alliance portfolios, rather than being struck by rigidity 
(Staw et al 1981). 
These findings also signify the value of evaluating the change in the 
value of resources from an evolutionary economics perspective rather than an 
ecological point of view (Lavie 2006). The framework proposed by Anderson 
and Tushman (1990) employs an ecological perspective of technological 
discontinuities that either destroy bulk of firm’s resources or significantly 
70 
 
increase their value, thereby challenging the existence of the firm. Applying 
an evolutionary economics lens (Nelson and Winter 1982), the effects of the 
technological discontinuity in this study rest between the extremes of 
competence-enhancing and competence-destroying. Therefore, while parts of 
firm’s resources are challenged, it does not lose its entire value and application 
in value creation. At the same time, certain resources are reinforced following 
the discontinuity while others are unaffected. Finally, technological 
discontinuities may introduce new resources whose value was unknown to the 
firms before the discontinuity. Alliance portfolios are affected by 
technological discontinuities differently depending on the type of resources 
they transfer between focal firms and their portfolio partners.  
This study suggests that detailed evaluation of how discontinues 
increase or reduce the value of resources can provide insights into portfolio 
reconfiguration and technological discontinuities.    
Forth, the insights gained from this essay can be extended to address 
evolution of networks of alliances (Ahuja et al. 2012). Research on networks 
of alliances and their implications for firm’s innovation and performance has 
progressed significantly over the past 30 years (Galaskiewicz 1985, Koka and 
Prescott 2008, McPherson et al. 1992, Soh 2010). However, these studies 
overlooked the fact that networks’ structures are not static leading to the 
network benefits being temporary and unstable (Ahuja et al. 2012). Without an 
understanding of the genesis and evolutionary dynamics of networks, our 
understanding of their performance implication remains incomplete. 
Actions taken by network’s agents drive network evolution (Ahuja et 
al. 2012, Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009) because “network structures emerge as a 
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result of self-seeking actions by focal nodes and their connections” (Ahuja et 
al. 2012, p.438). Therefore, alliance portfolio reconfigurations through 
formation of new ties and disbandment of current ties may be “the engines of 
network evolution” (Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009, p. 246). Implications of my 
thesis can be used to construct agent-based and other simulation models to 
study different scenarios of actions taken by firm (i.e., agents) for better 
understanding of network evolution (Davis et al. 2007). 
Fifth, this study contributes empirically to alliance research by 
demonstrating a rigorous approach to establishing alliance disbandment. The 
paucity of data on disbandment of alliances is an obstacle in the empirical 
research on the evolution of alliances, alliance portfolios and networks 
(Schilling 2009). Employing processes similar to that adopted in this study 
will provide a reliable alternative to current approaches.  
Finally, my approach in identifying an exogenous technological 
discontinuity and using it for a natural quasi-experiment contributes to the 
empirical aspects of evolution of alliances at different levels of analysis. Ahuja 
et al. (2012, p. 446) called for such a methodology acknowledging that “using 
exogenous shocks to identify effects is a promising arena, but finding data 
context with clear and usable exogenous shocks will remain a challenge.” 
This study examined the basic mechanism of alliance portfolios’ 
evolution as an emerging research theme in the field of strategy (Lavie and 
Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010).  Therefore, it can be improved on several fronts. 
The empirical context of this study involves a single industry. Future research 
should extend this study to industries with different resource requirements, 
which are affected by different forms of discontinuities, and where alliance 
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portfolio characteristics may differ. Second, the costs of disbandment of 
alliance ties in this essay are not taken into account. Disbandment cost could 
be different for alliances affected differently by discontinuities. Furthermore, 
reconfiguration of different portfolios could involve different costs due to their 
particular architectures. For example, in portfolios in which the partners are 
more interdependent (Gulati and Singh 1998, Puranam et al. 2012) a limited 
modification could become disproportionately disruptive to the focal firms. 
Future works may examine how different structural properties of alliance 
portfolios shape the reconfiguration process.  
This study could also be extended to incorporate performance 
implications of alliance portfolio reconfiguration to contribute to the vast 
literature on the survival and performance of firms following a technological 
discontinuity (e.g., Afuah 2001, Afuah and Utterback 1997, Mitchell and 
Singh 1993, Tripsas 1997). While alliance portfolio reconfiguration is 
important for renewal of resource-bases, it is costly and disruptive to the focal 
firms. Therefore, it is likely that there are boundaries on the benefits firms can 








ESSAY 2: STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON ALLIANCE 




An alliance portfolio comprises a stable set of direct alliances that allows a 
focal firm to obtain resources from partners at lower total cost than through 
market exchange or internal development (Lavie 2007, Lavie and Miller 2008, 
Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010). The effectiveness of the alliance 
portfolio is influenced by the structure of the portfolio, which facilitates the 
coordination and integration of activities and the transfer of resources between 
partners, at costs lower than the resulting benefits. Firms may seek to 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios in the event of external changes, such as 
technological discontinuities, that alter the desired benefits from the alliance 
portfolio (Lavie and Singh 2012). A technological discontinuity is a “technical 
advance so significant that no increase in scale, efficiency, or design can make 
older technologies competitive with the new technology” (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986, p. 441). Firms that rely on alliance portfolios for resources 
will be driven by technological discontinuities to change the composition or 
structure of the portfolios through establishing new alliances, and restructuring 
or disbanding existing alliances, processes that are disruptive and costly 
(Lavie and Singh 2012). However, few studies have examined how firms 
restructure their alliance portfolios, particularly after a technological 
discontinuity. I am not aware of any study that has specifically studied how 
the structural properties of alliance portfolios affect portfolio reconfiguration. 
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In this study, I rely on research on alliance portfolios (Kale and Singh 
2009, Lavie 2007, Lavie 2009, Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010), the 
resource-based view (Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984) and organizational 
design literature (Galbraith 1977, Gulati et al. 2012, Puranam et al. 2012, 
Tushman and Nadler 1978) to propose that alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
following a technological discontinuity is influenced by two key properties of 
the portfolio before the discontinuity, the interdependence between the focal 
firm and firms in its alliance portfolio, and the technological diversity of the 
portfolio. 
 Interdependence between organizations results when control over the 
conditions necessary for the achievement of desired outcomes is shared 
between organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The organizational design 
literature regards interdependence as one of the key outcomes of the sharing of 
tasks across multiple agents which require them to communicate with each 
other and coordinate their shared activities (Galbraith 1977, Puranam et al. 
2012, Simon 1973, Thompson 1967). The alliances literature views 
interdependence as a consequence of the effective integration of activities or 
sharing of resources between firms (Gulati and Singh 1998). Alliance 
portfolios therefore create interdependence through firms’ reliance on their 
partners for resources and through communication and coordination between 
firm and its portfolio partners (Gulati and Singh 1998, Oxley and Wada 2009). 
The communication and coordination requires establishment of alliance-
specific assets, and relational routines and processes. Hence, a focal firm’s 
interdependence with its partners will influence portfolio reconfiguration 
following a technological discontinuity because of the need to replace the 
75 
 
resources provided by partners and the costs of adapting or dismantling 
communication and coordination mechanisms between the firm and its 
partners. It is therefore likely that greater interdependence between the focal 
firm and its alliance portfolio partners will reduce portfolio reconfiguration 
following a technological discontinuity.  
The second characteristic, portfolio technological diversity, signifies 
the degree to which the portfolio’s alliance ties exchange diverse technologies 
between the firm and its partners. The technological diversity of an alliance 
portfolio will influence reconfiguration, as firms that have greater capabilities 
at managing diverse resources are more likely to establish more 
technologically diverse alliance portfolios; in turn, managing a technologically 
diverse alliance portfolio will allow the firm to develop greater capabilities to 
respond to external stimuli such as technological discontinuities. Firms with 
more diverse alliance portfolios may be inclined to undertake greater 
explorative search and may be more capable of forming new alliances and 
disbanding less valuable ones. Furthermore, a portfolio which provides access 
to a broad set of resources through a diverse set of partners is more likely to be 
affected by a technological discontinuity than a portfolio that provides access 
to a narrow set of resources through a focused set of firms. Therefore, greater 
technological diversity before the discontinuity may amplify alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration following the discontinuity. 
I test my hypotheses on a sample of 331 firms from the global 
biopharmaceutical industry between 1990 and 2000, a period which 
experienced a technological discontinuity through the emergence of 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening in 1995. This industry 
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is a particularly suitable context for this essay because of the extensive use of 
and reliance on alliance portfolios, high levels of reconfiguration of these 
alliance portfolios, the diversity of firms in the industry, and the impact of the 
technological discontinuity.  
This study answers calls to investigate the under-studied issue of “how 
and why firms change the configuration of their alliance portfolios over time” 
(Wassmer 2010, p.162). By establishing the impact of interdependence and 
technological diversity on alliance portfolio reconfiguration, I advance 
theoretical understanding of how structural characteristics affect how firms 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios.  The focus on the structural 
characteristics of an alliance portfolio strengthens the link between the alliance 
portfolio and organizational design literatures (Gulati and Singh 1998), and 
demonstrates the value of extending organizational design theory to alliance 
portfolios. The evaluation of alliance portfolio reconfiguration after a 
technological discontinuity demonstrates that such reconfiguration is 
influenced by a combination of external stimuli and internal characteristics, 
and helps integrate the external shocks and alliance portfolio literatures.  
The results of the study show that while alliance portfolios are helpful 
in several ways, their functionality may depend on their structural properties. 
In the context of this essay, interdependence of focal firms and their alliance 
portfolio partners before the discontinuity makes portfolio reconfiguration 
following the discontinuity more difficult, thereby undermining the flexibility 
of the focal firm in using the portfolios for accessing resources. Technological 
diversity of the alliance portfolio before the discontinuity, however, is shown 
to be promoting flexibility and facilitating reconfiguration. 
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These results show that inertia is not solely the result of social pressure 
(Uzzi 1996); rather, structural properties of alliance portfolios may also induce 
tendency toward preserving current conditions.  
In evaluating reconfiguration within a single industry over an 11 year 
period, I show the value of analyses that use “…multi-firm panel data on the 
evolution of alliance portfolios in particular industries” (Lavie and Singh 
2012, p.803).  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
An alliance portfolio is distinguished from a pool of individual alliances by the 
collective properties of the portfolio. Firms design and manage their alliance 
portfolios as an entity, so that the set of alliances that comprise a portfolio 
collectively enable the firm to achieve the objectives that guided the formation 
of the portfolio (Lavie 2007, Lavie and Miller 2008, Parise and Casher 2003). 
As a result, an alliance portfolio has structural characteristics or qualities that 
are absent from an identical pool of alliances that do not comprise a portfolio. 
It is therefore likely that alliance portfolio reconfiguration following a 
technological discontinuity will be influenced by the structure of the portfolio.   
A technological discontinuity may lead firms to reconfigure their 
alliance portfolios to improve access to resources to remain competitive in the 
post-discontinuity period. Technological discontinuities have varying impacts 
on different types of resources (Gatignon et al. 2002, Lavie 2006), depending 
on the nature of the discontinuity and the characteristics of the diverse 




Discontinuities may have particularly divergent impact on resources 
immediately following the discontinuity because of uncertainty over the 
specific nature and impact of the change. Firms often increase collaboration to 
understand how the disruption may affect the need for resources and explore 
new opportunities during this “era of ferment” (Anderson and Tushman 1990). 
Discontinuities have varying impact on resources, increasing or 
reducing the value of different resources. The value of an alliance portfolio 
lies in how well it can provide resources that are needed for the firm. To 
maximize the benefits they can gain from alliances, firms may reconfigure 
their portfolios (Lavie and Singh 2012) to form new alliances with firms that 
can provide them with needed resources and disband alliances with firms 
whose value of resources have been undermined. 
Reconfiguration of alliance portfolios is driven by the formation and 
disbandment of alliances. Following a discontinuity firms are likely to form 
more alliances to access the new resources that were either unavailable or 
unknown to them (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Tushman and Anderson 
1986). Alliances are often preferred over other modes of resource acquisitions 
when the resources are new and their value is hard to evaluate (Williamson 
1991). Moreover, in-house development of new resources may be a 
suboptimal choice because of the substantial resources required, the 
technological challenges faced, and because there may be time-compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
Firms are also likely to form alliances for resources that are not new 
but whose value is reinforced following the discontinuity. The potential for 
value creation through access to these resources increases the attractiveness of 
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firms that possess the required resources, increasing the likelihood of forming 
alliances (Dyer and Singh 1998). Therefore, firms will form more alliances for 
resources whose value is reinforced by a technological discontinuity.  
A technological discontinuity may challenge the value of some 
resources directly or may hinder their combination with other resources 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990, Grant 1996, Tushman and Anderson 1986). 
However, these resources retain some value and remain relevant. Firms will 
seek to upgrade these resources, in some cases through current alliances, but in 
other cases through new alliances with existing or new partners. 
Technological discontinuities are also likely to cause firms disband 
some of their current alliances. The reduced value of challenged resources 
undermines the value of alliances providing these resources. This will increase 
the likelihood that firms will disband more of these alliances to reduce costs 
and to redeploy resources into more productive uses (Capron et al. 1998). 
Firms may also disband alliances to accommodate new alliances, because the 
costs and difficulty of managing alliances will limit the number of alliances 
firms can maintain (Ocasio 1997, Singh and Mitchell 1996). 
In sum, firms’ alliance portfolio reconfiguration will increase 
following a technological discontinuity. Next, I evaluate how structural 
properties of alliance portfolios before a discontinuity shape their 
reconfiguration following the discontinuity.   
 
Interdependence of the Focal Firm and its Alliance Portfolio 
Firms that arrange and manage their alliances as a portfolio (Kale and Singh 
2009, Parise and Casher 2003) must coordinate and communicate with 
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multiple partners to realize the potential benefits of their portfolios. To derive 
the desired benefits from its alliance portfolio, the focal firm needs to align its 
own actions with the partners (Aggarwal et al. 2011, Gulati and Singh 1998, 
Gulati et al. 2012, Litwak and Hylton 1962, Puranam et al. 2012). 
Coordination refers to “the deliberate and orderly alignment or adjustment of 
partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined goals” (Gulati and Singh 1998, 
p. 537). Therefore, a firm is interdependent with its portfolio partners when it 
is reliant on its alliance portfolio partners to achieve the outcomes desired 
from its portfolio.  Alliances and alliance portfolios, in particular, are prone to 
coordination failure because they lack a formal structure and a command-and-
control mechanism available to hierarchical, formal organizations (Barnard 
1938, Litwak and Hylton 1962).  The coordination problem is exacerbated 
further when the focal firm is tightly interdependent with its portfolio partners 
due to the complex nature of the performed tasks. When the focal firm has a 
high degree of interdependence on its portfolio partners, it has to coordinate its 
actions with each of the partners, but also has to coordinate inter-partner 
interdependencies (Kotha and Srikanth 2013). 
As a case in point, Boeing formed several partnerships with designers 
and producers of components for its 787 aeroplane, significantly expanding its 
reliance on partnerships for the manufacture of these components. Boeing was 
highly interdependent with its alliance portfolio partners because the design 
and manufacture of almost every component required reciprocal interaction 
between Boeing and its partners. For example, Boeing had to coordinate the 
work of different partners--with producers of composite fuselage sections and 
producers of fasteners for connecting the pieces together-- because a minor 
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change in the design specification of one section needed change in how 
fasteners should be designed and used; and, similarly, a minor change in the 
design specification of the fasteners required modification of the composite 
sections. Therefore, a minor change in the shared task between Boeing and 
one of its partners meant that it had to redesign other tasks with other partners. 
In such high interdependence portfolios, even minor changes can have 
disproportionate repercussions across the entire portfolio (Kotha and Srikanth 
2013). 
An alliance portfolio which is characterized by low interdependence 
will allow a focal firm to alter an alliance or a product being jointly 
manufactured without this having significant impact on other alliances within 
a portfolio. For example, automobile manufacturers typically have extensive 
alliance portfolios to allow them to source components from many partners. 
However, most components are designed and manufactured independently, 
and are often modified or replaced without affecting other components. In 
such low interdependence portfolios, changes to the alliance portfolio can be 
undertaken in isolation, without significant spillover impact on other parts of 
the portfolio. 
   Coordination is possible when the partners plan the sequence of the 
tasks jointly and adjust their activities mutually (Gulati et al. 2012). Planning 
and mutual adjustments of activities require information sharing (Tushman 
and Nadler 1978) and close interaction between the focal firm and its portfolio 
partners (Parise and Casher 2003). The focal firm needs to invest in alliance-
specific assets for effective and efficient sharing, interpretation, and synthesis 
of information (Galbraith 1974, Gulati et al. 2012, Puranam et al. 2012). More 
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integrative forms of alliances (Oxley and Wada 2009) with dedicated 
personnel and formalized information sharing and decision making 
mechanisms could be particularly helpful for coordination between the focal 
firm and its alliance portfolio partners (Kale and Singh 2007, Schreiner et al. 
2009). Firms that are more interdependent with their alliance portfolio partners 
are expected to invest more in these mechanisms for coordination of their 
activities with the partners’ activities (Gulati et al. 2012). Therefore, more 
interdependent portfolios require more integrative alliance ties, more extensive 
information sharing mechanisms and greater investment in alliance-specific 
assets to coordinate the activities of the partners. 
Greater interdependence increases the difficulty and costs of 
reconfiguration, reducing the likelihood of reconfiguration relative to low 
interdependence alliance portfolios. Furthermore, interdependence, like many 
other organizational structure patterns are likely to be path-dependent (Sydow 
et al. 2009). Therefore, interdependence of the focal firm with its partners 
before the discontinuity reduces the likelihood of disbanding alliances with 
them following the discontinuity because their disbandment involves incurring 
higher costs. Disbandment of alliances with more interdependent partners 
would disturb the relational routines between partners, and personnel and 
resources dedicated to such alliances (Kale et al. 2002, Kale and Singh 2007).  
Following a discontinuity the focal firm is less likely to respond to the 
change as modification of one part of the value chain and the related alliances 
would require wider changes across several other alliance ties (Afuah 2000, 
2001, Kotha and Srikanth 2013) increasing the cost of disbandment of 
alliances in a more interdependent alliance portfolio. Therefore, following a 
83 
 
technological discontinuity a focal firm with more interdependent alliance 
portfolio partners is less likely to disband its alliance ties. 
Also, embeddedness of the focal firm in a higher-interdependence 
alliance portfolio could increase its inertia and subdue its tendency to respond 
to the technological discontinuity (Uzzi 1996). Embeddedness creates 
commitment and increases the cost of disbanding ties (Ghemawat 1991).  
Interdependence can also hinder the formation of new alliances. In a 
highly interdependent portfolio, addition of a new alliance or new partner may 
involve redesigning current interdependencies to maintain the portfolio’s 
desired properties (Parise and Casher 2003). Furthermore, inter-partner 
dependencies in the portfolio implies that the focal firm needs to take into 
account whether the current partners are willing to cooperate with the new 
firm or accept it in the same portfolio (Parise and Casher 2003).    
Research on alliances has found that firms can benefit from certain 
properties (e.g., Lavie and Miller 2008, Vassolo et al. 2004). Therefore, 
formation of any new alliance would involve taking into account how the new 
alliance changes the optimum overall property of the portfolio. For example, 
the degree to which the partners are from diverse locations and institutional 
environments is shown to affect the benefits that a focal firm can gain from its 
portfolio (Lavie and Miller 2008). Such properties are likely to be even more 
pronounced and consequential when the portfolio partners are interdependent. 
Therefore, possibility of the focal firm forming alliances for new resources or 
reinforced resources following a technological discontinuity could be 
restricted by the geographic location of the partners and how they fit within 
the current portfolio.  
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Alliance formation could also be limited by fewer alliance 
disbandments, which leaves the firm with fewer resources for investment in 
new alliances (Ocasio 1997, 2011, Singh and Mitchell 1996). Therefore, less 
disbandment of alliances in response to the technological discontinuity may 
lead to less formation of new alliances.  
Collectively, these arguments suggest that firms that are more 
interdependent with their alliance portfolio partners will be less likely to 
disband existing alliances and less likely to add new alliances following a 
technological discontinuity than firms that are less interdependent with their 
alliance portfolio partners.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the interdependence of a focal firm with its 
alliance portfolio partners before a technological discontinuity, the 
less its alliance portfolio reconfiguration following the technological 
discontinuity. 
 
Technological Diversity of the Alliance Portfolio 
The technological diversity of an alliance portfolio refers to the degree to 
which alliances in the portfolio transfer diverse technological resources 
between the firm and its partners. Research on firm diversification often 
emphasizes the way diversification helps firms weather the changing 
environmental conditions (Chakrabarti et al. 2007, Hannan and Freeman 
1977). That line of reasoning may imply that the technological diversity of the 
focal firm’s alliance portfolio weakens its motivation to react to the changes in 
the environment. However, the positional advantages emanating from 
diversification (Sorenson et al. 2006) do not indicate the firm’s actual reaction 
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in the face of environmental change. Therefore, applying that logic to the 
prediction of a firm’s response to a shifting environment can be misleading 
(Sorenson et al. 2006). Empirical analyses have shown that generalists with 
broad types of resources differ from specialists (those with a narrow range of 
resources) not only in their position in the face of environmental change 
(Dobrev et al. 2003, Sorenson et al. 2006), but also in their reaction to those 
changes. These findings support the logic that firms with a limited range of 
resources are less likely to react to changes in their peripheries. 
 A firm that is involved in more technologically diverse resource 
exchanges with its alliance partners is more likely to have built capabilities to 
deal with such diverse sets of resources   (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Grant 
1996, Kogut and Zander 1996). The existence of these capabilities and 
routines may drive firms to build more technologically diverse alliance 
portfolios in the first place, while other firms develop alliance portfolios for 
narrower spectrum of technologies (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).  
 Firms that are engaged in technologically diverse portfolios are likely 
to be more explorative in their search behavior leading them to be more 
responsive to environmental stimuli (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Lavie et al. 
2010, March 1991). Therefore, firms with more technologically diverse 
alliance portfolios before a technological discontinuity are more likely to sense 
the changes and to form and disband alliances following the discontinuity 
 A technologically diverse portfolio that transfers diverse resources 
between the focal firm and its partners is also more likely to be impacted by a 
technological discontinuity that affects wide range of resources in a portfolio. 
As the discontinuity reinforces certain types of resources in certain 
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technological areas and challenges other kinds of resources in other 
technological areas, firms with portfolios cutting across more diverse types of 
resources are more likely to have their resources impacted, leading to greater 
formation of alliances for reinforced and challenged resources and greater 
disbandment of alliances for challenged resources.  
Therefore, firms with alliance portfolios that are used for exchange of 
more diverse types of resources before a technological discontinuity are more 
likely to reconfigure their alliance portfolios following the discontinuity. 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the technological diversity of an alliance 
portfolio before a technological discontinuity, the greater its 
reconfiguration following the technological discontinuity. 
 
Interaction of Technological Diversity and Interdependence 
The interaction of the structural properties-- interdependence and 
technological diversity-- will shape the reconfiguration process. The less 
interdependent alliance portfolios are easier to reconfigure due to lower costs 
and disruption from disbanding and adding alliances, as argued in developing 
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, firms with more diverse alliance portfolios 
are more likely to be able to respond to external stimuli, following the 
arguments presented in Hypothesis 2. Therefore, the greatest level of 
reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity is likely to be 
observed among firms with the least interdependence with their alliance 
portfolio partners and with the most technologically diverse portfolios before 
the discontinuity. These firms have the greatest capacity to respond to the 
technological discontinuity and bear the least cost to do so.  
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Hypothesis 3: The less the interdependence of a focal firm with its 
alliance portfolio partners and the greater the alliance portfolio’s 
technological diversity before a technological discontinuity, the 





The setting for this study is the global biopharmaceutical industry. Two 
aspects of this industry make it an appropriate context for this study. First, this 
industry experiences high rates of change through continuous scientific 
discoveries and technological revolutions, some of which strike the industry as 
discontinuities. Second, alliances are a major feature of the industry, which 
firms establish to overcome technological and resource challenges (Pisano 
2006). Many firms organize and manage these alliances as portfolios (Vassolo 
et al. 2004).  
The industry experienced a major technological discontinuity in 1995 
through the introduction of combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening. Combinatorial chemistry refers to the “process by which millions of 
molecular constructions can be created and tested simultaneously and which 
underlies the speed of new drug development” (Beeley and Berger 2000, 
p.581). The reference to test procedures encompasses high-throughput 
screening, which emerged as complementary technology to combinatorial 
chemistry because it allowed rapid and large scale testing of new drugs. These 
technologies revolutionized the early stages of the drug discovery process; 
substantially reducing the cost and time for developing candidates for drugs 
88 
 
(Persidis 1997) as shown in Table 2.1. As a result they represented a major 
technological discontinuity that radically altered the value of resources, 
increasing the value of some resources while reducing the value of others.  
Despite the potential gains, there were considerable barriers to the 
adoption and implementation of these technologies. The new modes of drug 
discovery required extensive communication across scientific and business 
departments (Henderson 1994) and relied on bioinformatics resources and 
mechanized testing to develop and deal with the new molecular diversity that 
the new technologies produced. Bioinformatics and mechanized testing were 
emerging technologies in the industry in the early 1990s. 
Following the discontinuity, new resources different from those for 
traditional chemical and manual processes were required, some resources were 
reinforced, and others were challenged. Many chemists and firms experienced 
in the conventional methodologies were hesitant to shift to the emerging 
discovery paradigm (Nicolaou et al. 2002). However, the potential benefits of 
these methods offset concerns, leading many firms to invest in them in the 
1990s (Loch et al. 2001, Persidis 1995, 1997, 1998, Swanson 2002, Thomke 
and Kuemmerle 2002). 
Figure 2.1 suggests that the technological discontinuity occurred in 
1995. The slow but steady increase in the number of papers on the two 
technologies and the sudden surge in 1995 are consistent with the exponential 
patterns found in the studies of technology diffusion (Bass 1969, Norton and 
Bass 1987).  
Furthermore, 1995 marks a major trend change in the application of 
combinatorial chemistry to the design of the biopharmaceutical firms’ 
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compound libraries. Before 1995, no publication on combinatorial chemistry 
discussed compound library design, an issue that is of great importance to the 
application of these technologies (Swanson 2002). According to Swanson 
(2002), the year 1995 also marks the first application of information systems 
and computer sciences to compound library design. Therefore, I treat 1995 as 
the year of the technological discontinuity. I confirmed this conclusion 
through discussions with six industry insiders familiar with combinatorial 
chemistry and high-throughput screening.  
 
Data 
Firm level data was obtained from the Osiris database. I first extracted all 
firms with the primary NAICS (North American Industrial Classification 
System) codes 325412, 325413, and 3254144 that were publicly listed at any 
time between 1990 and 2000. I excluded firms that exited the industry before 
1995 or that entered after this year, as these firms did not experience the 
technological discontinuity, resulting in a sample of 519 firms.  
I restricted my analysis to the years 1990 to 2000 for three reasons. 
First, this period straddled the discontinuity in 1995 and was long enough to 
permit the establishment and disbandment of alliances. Second, alliance data 
before 1990 was not consistently available. Third, the study period ended 
before the discontinuity posed by the human genome mapping, which 
commenced in 2001, to avoid confounding effects. 
                                                            
4 325412: Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing; 325413: In-Vitro Diagnostic 




The RECAP database (www.recap.com) provided alliance data. 
RECAP records many alliances in the healthcare industry and has been used in 
previous research as a reliable data source (Schilling 2009). I screened all 519 
firms in my sample to ensure that each had at least one alliance between 1990 
and 2000. This filter yielded a final sample of 331 firms with 12,190 ties.  
Firms remained in the sample after 1995 unless they exited the industry or 
were acquired. I used these 331 firms as the focal firms with alliance 
portfolios. These firms were distributed as follows: 76% US, 3% Japan, 2% 
Germany, 2% France, with 17% from 16 other countries. 
Next, I ensured that all ties reported in the database were alliances. Of 
the 12,190 biopharmaceutical industry cooperative deals reported by RECAP, 
I established that only 6,136 were alliances. Several types of deals, such as 




Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is firm’s alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration measured as the sum of the number of alliances formed and 
disbanded for resources that were either new, reinforced or challenged in each 
year by each firm. Information on the formation of each alliance is recorded 
by RECAP. However, RECAP reported disbandment dates for only 10% of 
the cases. The absence of disbandment information is a common problem 
because most firms do not publicly announce disbandment of their alliances 
(Schilling 2009, Schilling and Phelps 2007).  
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To overcome the absence of data on disbandment dates, I performed an 
extensive search of the 6,136 alliances using the following process: each 
alliance in RECAP is identified by the name of the two involved partners, date 
of formation, subject of the partnership, the technology involved in the 
collaboration, the therapeutic area that the alliance dealt with, and several 
other data fields that can identify an alliance. For each alliance, I searched 
Factiva (www.dowjones.com/factiva) for relevant press releases using 
partners’ names and the subject of the alliance from the first day of the year in 
which the alliance was formed. The query involved the names of the partners 
and subject of the alliance5. When the subject of the alliance was not specific, 
I combined other fields of the alliance characteristics into the query to find 
relevant press releases. If the search term did not yield a relevant result, I 
incorporated different combinations of data fields to obtain the most 
comprehensive stream of press releases. In 15% of the cases, I found a press 
release that discussed disbandment of the alliance. In such cases the year of 
the press release was recorded as the date of disbandment.  
For the other alliances, I followed the stream of press releases and 
recorded the last year that at least one press release reported the alliance as the 
disbandment year. This is a reasonable approximation because alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry are closely watched by media and industry 
analysts. Several studies show that capital markets are sensitive to alliances 
announcements (Anand and Khanna 2000, Kale et al. 2002). Alliances are 
particularly important among biopharmaceutical firms, who often provide 
public updates on the progress of their alliances. This procedure provides a 
                                                            
5 Several firms underwent name changes. I carefully checked the history of name 
changes of all firms through press release searches. 
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more reliable estimate of disbandment of alliances than the common approach 
of assuming disbandment between three to five years (e.g., Stuart 2000). 
I also accounted for acquisitions made by the focal firms. When a firm 
is acquired, its alliances are inherited by the acquiring firm, except where anti-
trust regulations may require that they be disbanded. I checked the acquisitions 
made by the focal firms in the sample. Then, I extracted the alliances that 
acquired firms formed before their acquisitions by the focal firms between 
1990 and 2000. Using Factiva, I detected the alliances that were inherited by 
the focal firms after they had acquired any of the partners involved in such 
alliances. These types of alliances constitute 9.53% of the cases in my sample.  
The next step in building the dependent variables was to identify 
alliances for new, reinforced, and challenged resources. Each alliance in 
RECAP is defined by the technology that is the focus of collaboration. For 
example, an alliance marked as “gene therapy” transfers the resources needed 
for application of DNA for treatment of diseases. RECAP’s alliance 
technology classification contains 53 distinct categories; two were for 
combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening.  
I then surveyed industry experts to classify each of the 51 categories of 
technologies as “reinforced by the discontinuity”, “challenged by the 
discontinuity” or “unaffected by the discontinuity”. I treated the categories 
relating to combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput screening as requiring 
new resources. A search of published papers on combinatorial chemistry and 
high-throughput screening in the 1990s identified 30 experts who had 
witnessed the technological discontinuity in the 1990s, to whom I emailed a 
survey. Six scientists responded. Respondents classified the technologies into 
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reinforced, challenged, and unaffected by the discontinuity. Cohen’s kappa of 
0.30 (p<0.001) indicated agreement among the respondents. Any value 
between 0.21 and 0.40 indicates a fair agreement over the classifications 
(Landis and Koch 1977). Respondents also indicated that four categories are 
related to genomic resources; and, therefore, they are not new, reinforced, or 
challenged by the discontinuity in 1995. I used the classification of the 
technologies to indicate each alliance as being for challenged or reinforced 
resources. 
Explanatory Variables. My main explanatory variables are constructed as 
interaction of a dummy variable “Years 1996-2000” (equal to 1 for years 1996 
through 2000; zero otherwise) with two other variables:  average 
interdependence of the focal firm with the alliance portfolio partners before 
1995 (shortened to “average interdependence before 1995”) and the average 
technological diversity of the alliance portfolio before 1995 (shortened to 
“average technological diversity before 1995”). To measure average 
interdependence before 1995, I followed Gulati and Singh (1998) in 
classifying the interdependence between the partners in an alliance into 
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal (Thompson 1967). In general, pooled 
interdependence describes situations in which "each part renders a discrete 
contribution to the whole, and each is supported by the whole” (Thompson 
1967, p.54). Such situations involve no serial ordering of activities and the 
lowest cost of coordination and communication. Alliance partners’ 
interdependence is pooled when they “pool their resources to achieve a shared 
strategic goal, the common benefits arise from combining resources into a 
shared pool, and each partner uses resources from the shared pool. These 
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relatively small interdependencies entail low coordination requirements but 
provide partners with benefits from the pooled resources.” (Gulati and Singh 
1998, p.795) 
 Sequential interdependence refers to the situations where “the activities 
of each partner are distinct and are serially arrayed so that the activities of one 
partner precede those of another, resulting in a higher degree of coordination 
than in pooled interdependence” (Gulati and Singh 1998, p.795). Compared 
with pooled interdependence, sequential interdependence requires more 
coordination and communication. Sequentially interdependent alliance 
partners have to coordinate sequence and order of movement of products and 
services that has to be transferred from one partner to the other. The 
coordination in the alliances with sequentially interdependent partners requires 
more investment in communication and alliance specific assets. As such, they 
are more difficult to disband and form compared with alliances where partners 
have pooled interdependence. 
 Reciprocal interdependence entails the highest level of communication 
and coordination between partners for the achievement of their shared goals.  
Reciprocal interdependence exists in an alliance when partners “come together 
to exchange outputs with each other simultaneously” (Gulati and Singh 1998, 
p.796). In other words, each partner may simultaneously generate output for 
and receive input form the other partner. Anticipating the action of the other 
partner (Puranam et al. 2012) and maintaining the optimum sequence and 
timing of the activities in this case requires constant sharing of information 
and coordination. Among the three types of interdependencies, reciprocal 
interdependence is the highest level of interdependence and demands the most 
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level of partners’ coordination and information sharing. It requires more 
investment in information system and coordination and more integrative forms 
of alliances than the other two types of interdependencies do. Therefore, 
alliances with reciprocally interdependent partners are the costliest and hardest 
to disband and form.  
 To determine how interdependent the partners in an alliance are, I used 
the value creation logic of the alliance to find out how the partners collaborate 
and share resources and capabilities. Value creation “refers to the process by 
which the capabilities of the partners are combined so that the competitive 
advantage of either the hybrid or one or more of the partners is improved” 
(Borys and Jemison 1989, p. 241). Gulati and Singh (1998) argued that as 
value creation logic leads “to distinct levels and types of interaction between 
adjacent units in a value chain” (Borys and Jemison 1989, p.241) it can serve 
as a proxy for level of partners’ interdependence in alliances.  
Gulati and Singh (1998) suggested eight value creation logics in 
alliances and how each signifies a certain level of partner interdependence. I 
adopted a modified version of their value creation typology. Table 3.1 




Table 3.1 Value Creation Logics and Interdependence Types 
 Pooled Interdependence*  Sequential Interdependence Reciprocal Interdependence* 
Value creation 
logic 
- Sharing costs/risks - Access to new markets - Sharing complementary technology 
 - Access to new products/technology - Joint development of new technology
 - Access to financial resources - Joint marketing 
* Gulati and Singh’s (1998) classification included “Sharing production facilities” as a value creation logic under pooled 
interdependence category and “Reducing the time span of innovation” under reciprocal interdependence category. I have not used 
these logics as none of the RECAP contracts implied these logics. Instead, “joint marketing” value creation is added as it signifies 













For example, when the value creation is achieved through sharing of 
costs/risks, the partners’ interdependence is pooled. In contrast, when the 
value creation is achieved through access to new markets, the partners are 
sequentially interdependent. Therefore, one partner’s output (product or 
service that is supposed to be exported) is another partners input (product or 
service that is supposed to be received and distributed). Access to new market 
requires more coordination between alliance partners compared with sharing 
of costs/risks. And, for example, when the value creation is achieved through 
joint development of new technology the two partners are reciprocally 
interdependent as throughout the technology development process each 
partner will simultaneously send information, service, or physical material to 
the other partner. This type of value creation entails the highest level of 
interdependence and requires the closest degree of communication, 
collaboration, and coordination. 
Each alliance is governed by one or more contracts that outline the 
purpose of the alliance and roles and responsibilities of the partners. Alliances 
in the RECAP database are identified by the contracts signed between the 
partners. I used these contracts to define the value creation logic of each 
alliance. Table 3.2 contains the types of contracts, their definition, and the 
value creation logic that these definitions imply. Using Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2 classifications I defined what type of interdependence each contract 
implies. When an alliance involves more than one contract each implying 
different levels of interdependence, the contract with the highest degree of 
interdependence supersedes the other contracts. Therefore, if an alliance 
involves a manufacturing (sequential) and a co-promotion (reciprocal) 
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contract, the partners will have reciprocal interdependence because reciprocal 
interdependence supersedes sequential interdependence. 
The next step was to build an index that captures the presence of 
alliances with different degrees of interdependence in a firm’s portfolio in a 
year. The index assigns greater scores to portfolios whose partners are more 
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, where ݊௜௧௣௢௢௟௘ௗ is the number of alliances in firm i’s portfolio in year t whose 
partners are interdependent in a pooled manner, ݊௜௧௦௘௤௨௘௡௧௜௔௟ is the number of 
alliances in firm i’s portfolio in year t whose partners are sequentially 
interdependent, ݊௜௧௥௘௖௜௣௥௢௖௔௟is the number of alliances in firm i’s portfolio in year 
t whose partners are reciprocally interdependent, and ௜ܰ௧ is the total number of 
alliances in firm i’s portfolio in year t. This index assigns more weight to the 
proportion of alliances whose partners are more interdependent. This index is 
then averaged from 1990 to 1994 for every firm to calculate the average 
interdependence before 1995. 
 Average technological diversity before 1995 is calculated using 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index subtracted from 1 (i.e., 1-HHI) and Recap’s 
technological domain that was assigned to every alliance. There are 53 distinct 
types of technological domains that identify each alliance in Recap. Average 
technological diversity before 1995 is therefore calculated as the average of 




 Table 3.2 Contract Definitions and Value Creation Logics 
 Continued on the next page 
 
Contract Definition Value creation logic 
Co-Development - Both parties participate in and share the costs of clinical development and/or 
commercial expenses.  
- Joint development of 
new technology 
Co-Market - A commercialization venture wherein two parties promote and sell two 
separate versions or brands of a single product, with each party booking sales 
of its own brand. 
- Sharing costs/risks 
Co-Promotion - Both parties promote a single product, with one party booking all the sales, 
and the other party receiving compensation as a percentage of net sales or 
profits. The parties may or may not share each other’s' marketing and other 
sales expenses. 
- Joint marketing 
Collaboration - Both parties participate in R&D activities and perhaps commercial activities. - Joint development of 
new technology 
Cross-License - One party obtains a license to intellectual property of the other party in 




Development - One party sponsors R&D at the other company, e.g. a biopharmaceutical 
company sponsoring R&D at a small biotech, where the biotech completes all 
development on its own, paid for by the biopharmaceutical company. A 
Development agreement is distinguished from a collaboration agreement in 
that the smaller company is performing all development, rather than both 
parties sharing responsibility as in a collaboration agreement. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Distribution - One party is engaged to sell a product in final manufactured form as supplied 
by the originating party. Compensation back to the originating party is often in 
the form of a Transfer Price, with the Distributor paying the originator a 
percentage of the established Net Selling Price for a supply of finished product 
that it will sell to 3rd parties. 
- Access to new market 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
Contract Definition Value creation logic 
License - One party obtains a License under the other party's intellectual property to 
research, develop, make, use, sell, or market or promote a product or 
technology. Under a License agreement, the originator of the technology 
typically retains some rights in the product/technology and receives continuing 
payments such as milestone payments and royalties on net sales of the 
product/technology throughout the term of the agreement. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Loan - A Loan is a payment or promise of future payment from one party to 
another. 
- Access to financial 
resources 
Manufacturing - In a Manufacturing agreement, one party manufactures a product for use by 
the other company. Typically, the originating company hires a contract 
manufacturer, though Manufacturing agreements may also involve a large 
biopharmaceutical company manufacturing product for a smaller co to which 
it is out-licensing one of its products. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Marketing - In a Marketing agreement, the Licensor company obtains certain rights to a 
product not otherwise disclosed or classified. 
- Access to new market 
Research - In a Research agreement, a sponsoring party engages another party to 
perform R&D services in the discovery and/or lead stages of an R&D project. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Sublicense - A Sublicense concerns the conveyance of a license from one party to 
another, wherein that license was earlier granted to the conveyor by a third 
party. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Supply - In a Supply agreement, the R&D company will make or have made a product 
for use or sale by the Client company. 
- Access to new 
product/technology 
Source: www.recap.com (contracts and definitions only)
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Dummy variable “Years 1990-1994” indicated pre-discontinuity period 
(equal 1 for years 1990 through 1994; zero otherwise). This variable is 
included to contrast the post-discontinuity and pre-discontinuity periods and 
capture the increase in alliance portfolio reconfiguration following the 
technological discontinuity in 1995. 
Control Variables. R&D intensity, measured as firm’s R&D expenses divided 
by sales, controlled for firm capabilities, which could have affected alliance 
formation and disbandment (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Rothaermel and 
Alexandre 2009).  Sales (logged) and firm age accounted for firms’ size, 
resource availability and experience. R&D intensity and Sales jointly had 
25.80% missing data points. Reeb and Koh (2013) showed that firms may 
intentionally refuse to disclose their R&D data. Consequently, missing data 
points could result in biased estimations. Therefore, I used multiple-
imputation (Rubin 1987) to fill out the missing data for R&D intensity and 
Sales data. 
Dummy variables indicating firms’ countries of origin and primary 
NAIC codes (at the six-digit level) control for possible differences in the 
likelihood of establishing and disbanding alliances across countries and areas 
of specialization. These variables were extracted from the Osiris database. 
I controlled for the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals 
in a year undertaken by each firm because these may substitute for alliances 
(Dyer et al. 2004, Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002).  I obtained this variable 
from RECAP. The number of clinical trials filed by a firm in each year 
controls for the extent of a firm’s involvement in drug discovery and for its 
resources. This data was obtained from the US National Institute of Health 
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(NIH) database (http://clinicaltrials.gov/) and from clinical trials data from 
RECAP. The number of patents applied for in each year controlled for the 
possession of technological competencies, which may affect each firm’s need 
for alliances and its desirability as a partner (Ahuja 2000b). Finally, the 
number of total ties in 1994 counted the number of alliances formed in 1994 or 
formed before 1994 but continued to exist by 1994. This variable controlled 
for the size of each firm’s portfolio before the discontinuity, which could 
determine how many alliances would be disbanded and formed following the 
discontinuity. Also, the extent to which firms are connected to other firms 
could affect their status and the likelihood of being chosen as partners (Gulati 





 Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 




  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration 
1.50 3.41             
2.  Average interdependence 
before 1995 
2.12 0.26 0.11***            
3.  Average technological 
diversity before 1995 
0.40 0.27 0.30*** 0.13***           
4.  Average interdependence 
before 1995 × Years 1996-2000 
1.04 1.08 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.02          
5.  Average technological 
diversity before 1995 × Years 
1996-2000 
0.19 0.28 0.37*** 0.05** 0.50*** 0.72***         
6.  R&D intensity t-1 14.95 48.42 -0.06*** -0.15*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.05**        
7.  Ln(Sales) t-1 9.49 3.10 0.45*** 0.13*** 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.22*** -0.27***           
8.  Number of M&A deals t-1 0.15 0.53 0.43*** 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.21*** -0.03 0.31***         
9.  Number of clinical trials t-1 0.40 1.97 0.37*** 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.26*** -0.02 0.25*** 0.26***       
10.  Number of patents t-1 8.42 23.86 0.61*** 0.15*** 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.25*** -0.04* 0.50*** 0.34*** 0.35***     
11.  Number of total ties in 1994 2.74 4.70 0.69*** 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.15*** 0.30*** -0.07*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.68***   
12.  Firm age 21.86 30.35 0.37*** 0.03*** 0.25*** 0.06** 0.16*** -0.05** 0.60*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.48*** 0.36***  
Minimum   0 0 0 0 0 0 0.69 0 0 0 0 1 




Random effect Poisson estimation is used to test Hypothesis 1 (H1), 
Hypothesis 2 (H2), and Hypothesis 3 (H3).   
To build a model for testing H1, three main variables are used: a 
dummy variable indicating pre-discontinuity period (Years 1990-1994), a 
dummy variable indicating post-discontinuity period (Years 1996-2000), and 
an interaction term involving average of the interdependence of the portfolio 
before the discontinuity and the post-discontinuity period dummy variable 
(Average interdependence before 1995 × Years 1996-2000). The two time 
period dummy variables capture the change in alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration in the post-discontinuity period compared with pre-
discontinuity period. The interaction of the post-discontinuity time period 
dummy with the average pre-discontinuity portfolio interdependence captures 
how the post-discontinuity increase in reconfiguration is moderated by the pre-
discontinuity structural properties of the portfolio. The same procedure is used 
for testing H2, except for “Average technological diversity before 1995” that 
is used as the moderating variable.  
H3 involves the simultaneous effect of two moderating factors on the 
increase in the alliance portfolio reconfiguration following the technological 
discontinuity. Using the mean of one of the interacting variables (Average 
interdependence before 1995) I divided the sample into two groups: high 
interdependence and low interdependence and compared the coefficients of 
the interaction term “Average technological diversity before 1995 × Years 




Table 3.4 provides the results of the tests for the hypotheses. Model 1 is the 
base model. Coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative and significant (b=-
0.14, p<0.10). Coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is positive and significant 
(b=0.51, p<0.01). χ2 test confirms that the coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is 
statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01), 
showing that alliance portfolio reconfiguration increased following the 
technological discontinuity.  
Model 2 tests H1 which suggest that the greater the interdependence of 
a focal firm with its alliance portfolio partners before a technological 
discontinuity, the lower the alliance portfolio reconfiguration following the 
technological discontinuity. The coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative 
but non-significant (b=-0.10, p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is 
positive and significant (b=1.71, p<0.01) and statistically greater than the 
coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” (p<0.01). Furthermore, the coefficient of the 
interaction term “Average interdependence before 1995 × Years 1996-2000” 
is negative and significant (b=-0.55, p<0.01). The negative coefficient of the 
interaction terms shows that the interdependence of the focal firms and its 
alliance portfolio partners is negatively associated with portfolio 
reconfiguration following the technological discontinuity, supporting H1. 
Model 3 tests H2 which suggests that the greater the technological 
diversity of an alliance portfolio before a technological discontinuity, the 
greater its reconfiguration following the technological discontinuity. The 
coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative but non-significant (b=-0.12, 
p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is positive and significant 
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(b=0.26, p<0.05), and statistically greater than the coefficient of “Years 1990-
1994” (p<0.01). And, the coefficient of the interaction term “Average 
technological diversity before 1995 × Years 1996-2000 “is positive and 
significant (b=0.43, p<0.05). The positive coefficient of the interaction term 
supports H2 showing that alliance portfolio technological diversity before the 
discontinuity is positively associated with portfolio reconfiguration following 
the discontinuity. 
 H3 suggests that the less the interdependence of a focal firm with its 
alliance portfolio partners and the greater the alliance portfolio’s technological 
diversity before a technological discontinuity, the greater the alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration following the technological discontinuity. Therefore, the 
greatest level of alliance portfolio reconfiguration following the discontinuity 
is expected to be observed among the firms who had the most diverse alliance 
portfolios and the least interdependence with their alliance portfolio partners. 








Table 3.4 Random Effect Poisson Estimation of Alliance Portfolio Reconfiguration (H1, H2, and H3) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Alliance portfolio 
Reconfiguration 





H3: Alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
(High interdependence sub-sample) 
H3: Alliance portfolio reconfiguration  
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N 2253 1719 1719 662 1057 
Log-Likelihood -3059.33 -2610.60 -2610.89 -1193.05 -1372.40 
Chi-squared 730.72*** 725.35*** 727.11*** 489.02*** 292.15*** 
Notes Country and NAIC dummies included but not reported 




 I divided the sample into two groups: one group comprising the firms 
whose “average interdependence before 1995” is larger than the mean of the 
entire sample’s “average interdependence before 1995” ( തܺ=2.12); and the 
second group including the firms whose “average interdependence before 
1995” is smaller than the mean of the entire sample’s “average 
interdependence before 1995” ( തܺ=2.12). Model 4 and Model 5 include the 
interaction term “Average technological diversity before 1995 × Years 1996-
2000”. Model 4 is run on the sub-sample with above-mean “average 
interdependence before 1995” and Model 5 is run on the sub-sample with 
below-mean “average interdependence before 1995”.  
In Model 4 the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is positive, but non-
significant (b=0.01, p=n.s.). The coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is positive, 
but non-significant (b=0.07, p=n.s.). However, a χ2 test confirms that the 
coefficient of “Years 1996-2000”” is statistically greater than “Years 1990-
1994” (p<0.05) showing that following the technological discontinuity 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration has increased among the firms in the sub-
sample used for Model 4. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term 
“Average technological diversity before 1995 × Years 1996-2000 “is positive 
and significant in Model 4 (b=0.65, p<0.05). Similar results are found in 
Model 5. 
In Model 5 the coefficient of “Years 1990-1994” is negative and 
significant (b=-0.34, p<0.01). The coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is 
positive, but non-significant (b=0.16, p=n.s.). However, a χ2 test confirms that 
the coefficient of “Years 1996-2000” is statistically greater than “Years 1990-
1994” (p<0.01) showing that following the technological discontinuity 
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alliance portfolio reconfiguration has increased among the firms in the sub-
sample used for Model 5. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term 
“Average technological diversity before 1995 × Years 1996-2000 “is positive 
and significant in Model 5 (b=0.74, p<0.01).  
The coefficient of the interaction term “Average technological 
diversity before 1995 × Years 1996-2000 “in Model 5 (low-interdependence 
sample) is statistically greater than the coefficient of the same interaction term 
in Model 4 (high-interdependence sample) (p<0.01). These results show that 
the facilitating effect of the technological diversity on the post-discontinuity 
reconfiguration is greater when the focal firm is less interdependent with its 
alliance portfolio partners. Therefore, H3 is supported. 
 
Robustness Test 
The index of interdependence in this paper uses weights to calculate the 
average number of alliances ties with pooled, sequential, or reciprocal 
interdependence in the portfolios. Since no other paper has used such an index 
to measure interdependence in alliance portfolios, I tested if another way of 
weight assignment yields similar results to the results of the current weighting 
scheme. I assigned 0, 1, and 2 to the proportion of ties with pooled, sequential, 
and reciprocal interdependence, respectively, and replaced the new index with 
the one used in the models of Table 3.4. The results are similar across the 
Models 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, using the new weighting scheme, Model 5 did 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined how structural properties of alliance portfolios condition 
their reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity. The results show 
that a focal firm’s interdependence with its alliance portfolio partners hinders 
its alliance portfolio reconfiguration.  A firm is interdependent with its 
portfolio partners when the control over the necessary conditions for the 
achievement of the outcomes desired from the portfolio is shared between the 
firm and its alliance portfolio partners. Interdependence requires the firm to 
coordinate its actions with its partners (Aggarwal et al. 2011, Gulati and Singh 
1998, Gulati et al. 2012, Litwak and Hylton 1962, Puranam et al. 2012). 
Coordination, in turn, requires mutual adjustment of actions, communication, 
and information sharing (Gulati et al. 2012, Tushman and Nadler 1978). Firms 
tend to invest in more integrative forms of alliances and alliance specific-
assets to facilitate information sharing and communication with their partners 
(Galbraith 1974, Gulati et al. 2012, Puranam et al. 2012). These investments 
make it costlier and harder for firms to disband current alliances and form new 
alliances in more interdependent portfolios, impeding alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity. 
The results also supported the idea that alliance portfolio technological 
diversity facilitates alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Firms that are engaged 
in technologically diverse portfolios have greater exposure to broader sets of 
markets and industries, and thus are likely to have greater capabilities in 
organizing and adapting to changes in their environment (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf 2006, Lavie et al. 2010, March 1991). These capabilities may be 
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transferable to alliance portfolio reconfiguration, allowing these firms to 
undertake greater reconfiguration following a technological discontinuity.  
The interaction of interdependence and technological diversity 
influences portfolio reconfiguration, as firms with more diverse and less 
interdependent alliance portfolios reconfigure more following a technological 
discontinuity. This shows that the overall structural properties of alliance 
portfolios affect their reconfiguration, and by implication, their effectiveness. 
Though this is consistent with the view that alliance portfolios have collective 
properties, the impact of portfolio structure is under-studied.   
 This study suggests that while firms’ reconfiguration of alliance 
portfolios increase following a technological discontinuity, it is likely to be 
shaped by the structural properties of the portfolios. As firms differ with 
respect to the properties of their portfolios, their pattern of alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration will inevitably differ across different firms.  
 This study contributes to the literature on alliance portfolios. It 
addresses the evolution of alliance portfolios and shows that firms’ alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration is conditioned by the portfolios’ structure. Therefore, 
it answers the call to investigate the under-studied issue of “how and why 
firms change the configuration of their alliance portfolios over time” 
(Wassmer 2010, p.162). 
Relatedly, this study suggests that firms actively manage alliance 
portfolios, as reflected through the impact of the structural properties. 
Therefore, it indicates the value of studying alliances from a portfolio 
perspective, which will provide a more complete picture than from studying 
them as independent ties. For example, research on alliance survival and 
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termination (e.g., Lunnan and Haugland 2008) has studied alliances as 
independent ties, overlooking the fact that firms increasingly maintain their 
alliances as portfolios (Parise and Casher 2003) and that portfolios have 
structural properties. This may lead to bias in estimation of the antecedents of 
alliances’ survival. 
This study also contributes to the examination of firms’ response to 
technological discontinuities (Reinganum 1983, Tripsas 1997, Tushman and 
Anderson 1986). Researchers are divided on whether and how firms respond 
to technological discontinuities. While some studies highlight the advantages 
of new entrants into an industry (e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990, Dobrev et 
al. 2003, Henderson and Clark 1990), other scholars acknowledge the 
advantages of incumbents in surviving the selective forces of technological 
discontinuities (e.g., Singh 1997, Tripsas 1997). The latter particularly has 
recognized the role of alliances in helping firms survive and adapt to the 
discontinuities (Lavie and Singh 2012, Rothaermel 2001, 2002, Singh 1997). 
This study’s implications on different properties of alliance portfolios in 
encouraging or discouraging reconfiguration in the face of discontinuities 
highlights the importance of studying alliances not as individual ties, but as 
portfolios of interacting ties. While alliances are helpful in renewal of 
resource-bases of firms, certain configurations may hinder firms’ adaptation to 
discontinuities. Particularly, heavy interdependence on partners could hinder 
firms’ efforts to respond to exogenous shocks. 
The findings of the study have yet a broader implication for research 
on organizational design literature (Gulati and Singh 1998, Puranam et al. 
2012). Research suggests that investment on inter-partner or inter-department 
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communication and integration help the agents coordinate their activities and 
manage their interdependencies in static environments where flexibility and 
agility are not particularly important (Tushman and Nadler 1978). The results 
of this essay show that interdependence between the focal firm and its 
portfolio partners may undermine its flexibility to respond through portfolio 
reconfiguration to the changing environmental conditions in the form of 
technological discontinuities. 
Finally, this study contributes empirically to alliance research by 
demonstrating a rigorous approach to establishing alliance disbandment. The 
paucity of data on disbandment of alliances is an obstacle in the empirical 
research on the evolution of alliances, alliance portfolios, and networks 
(Schilling 2009). Employing processes similar to that adopted in this study 
will provide a reliable alternative to current approaches. 
 This study examined the process of alliance portfolios’ evolution as an 
emerging research theme in the field of strategy (Lavie and Singh 2012, 
Wassmer 2010).  Therefore, it can be improved on several fronts. The 
empirical context of this study involves a single industry. Future research 
should extend this study to industries with different resource requirements, 
which are affected by different forms of discontinuities, and where alliance 
portfolio characteristics may differ.  
Second, the measurement of interdependence could be improved. 
Thompson’s (1967) typology of interdependence may not capture the true 
nature of interdependence as it does not address the shared activities’ incentive 
structure—the way the agents’ actions are measure and rewarded (Puranam et 
al. 2012). Observing and measuring the structure of incentives in alliance 
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portfolios is notoriously challenging, making it difficult to develop theoretical 
insights. Therefore, simulation and computational models may be used to 
study different scenarios where alliance portfolio partners agree to different 
performance measurement rules and incentive structures (Davis et al. 2007). 
More direct and comprehensive measures of interdependence between 
portfolio firms may provide additional insights.        
 This study could also be extended to incorporate performance 
implications of alliance portfolio reconfiguration to contribute to the 
literatures on the impact of alliance portfolios on firm performance, and on 
firm performance following a technological discontinuity (e.g., Afuah 2001, 
Afuah and Utterback 1997, Mitchell and Singh 1993, Tripsas 1997).While 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration is important for renewal of resource-bases, it 
is costly and disruptive to the focal firms. It would be helpful to establish the 








DICUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I investigated reconfiguration of alliance portfolios following a 
technological discontinuity. Conventional wisdom maintains that alliance 
portfolios help firms obtain resources from partners at lower total cost than 
through market exchange or internal development (Lavie 2007, Lavie and 
Miller 2008, Lavie and Singh 2012, Wassmer 2010). However, research has 
not addressed how an external stimulus such as a technological discontinuity 
that alters the value of resources may lead firms to modify their alliance 
portfolios to improve access to required resources. To address this issue, I 
asked two interrelated research questions and, using a longitudinal sample of 
global biopharmaceutical firms, answered each in a separate essay. 
First, I asked “How does a technological discontinuity that alters the 
value of different types of resources cause firms to reconfigure their alliance 
portfolios, by forming new alliances to access required resources and by 
disbanding current alliances that provide redundant resources?” 
 The results showed that firms responded to the technological 
discontinuity by forming new alliances and disbanding current alliances. 
Particularly, firms formed more alliances for new resources introduced by the 
discontinuity and for resources that were reinforced or challenged by the 
discontinuity. At the same time, firms disbanded more alliances for the 
resources challenged by the technological discontinuity. Contrary to my initial 
expectations, firms also disbanded more alliances for reinforced resources. 
These results confirmed that a technological discontinuity will lead firms to 
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reconfigure their alliance portfolios, and that reconfiguration will differ by the 
extent to which the value of different resources is affected. Moreover, the 
results showed that alliances in a portfolio interact—formation of more 
alliances for reinforced resources leads to more disbandment of alliances for 
challenged resources following the discontinuity. 
 Essay 2 built on the results of essay 1, and asked the question:  “how is 
reconfiguration of alliance portfolios shaped by their structural properties?” 
 The results showed that two structural properties of alliance portfolios, 
in tandem with technological discontinuities, shape their reconfiguration. First, 
interdependence of focal firms with their alliance portfolio partners before the 
discontinuity diminishes their reconfiguration following the technological 
discontinuity. Second, alliance portfolio technological diversity before the 
technological discontinuity amplifies their reconfiguration following the 
discontinuity. Finally, the two properties interact to condition firm’s alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration: the greatest reconfiguration following a 
technological discontinuity is observed among firms with the least 
interdependence with their alliance portfolio partners and with the greatest 
technologically diverse alliance portfolios. 
 Together, the results of this essay confirmed that alliance portfolios 
have collective properties which may shape their evolution. 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis examined “how and why firms change the configuration of their 
alliance portfolios over time” (Wassmer 2010, p.162). My focus on 
reconfiguration within a single industry over an 11-year period responded to 
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calls to use “…multi-firm panel data on the evolution of alliance portfolios in 
particular industries” (Lavie and Singh 2012, p.803). 
I made several theoretical contributions and two empirical 
contributions. First, I showed that alliance portfolios evolve in response to 
external, exogenous stimuli such as technological discontinuities. Second, I 
showed how firms undertake reconfiguration through forming new alliances 
and disbanding current alliances. The results confirmed that alliance portfolios 
do not evolve merely through internal processes of path-dependency or life-
cycle stages. Rather, external shocks—in the form of technological 
discontinuities—may also lead firms to reconfigure alliance portfolios. 
Also, the results showed that firms have limited capacity for 
maintaining ties, leading to increased likelihood of alliance disbandment as 
more ties are added to the portfolio. These results are consistent with the view 
that firms can and do react to major external threats by modifying their 
alliance portfolios, rather than being struck by rigidity (Staw et al 1981). 
Third, my thesis showed that the structural properties of alliance 
portfolios play an important role in shaping their evolution. By establishing 
the impact of interdependence and technological diversity on alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration, I advance theoretical understanding of how structural 
characteristics affect the way firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios.  The 
focus on the structural characteristics of an alliance portfolio, strengthens the 
link between the alliance portfolio and organizational design literatures (Gulati 
and Singh 1998), and demonstrates the value of extending organizational 
design theory to alliance portfolios.  
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The insights from Essay 1 and 2 collectively demonstrate that alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration is influenced by a combination of external stimuli 
and internal characteristics, and help integrate the external shock and alliance 
portfolio literatures.  Relatedly, this study suggests that firms actively manage 
alliance portfolios, as reflected in the impact of the structural properties on 
portfolio reconfiguration. 
This study also makes two important empirical contributions to the 
research on alliances. First, it demonstrates a rigorous approach to establishing 
alliance disbandment. The paucity of data on disbandment of alliances is an 
obstacle in the empirical research on the evolution of alliances, alliance 
portfolios, and networks (Schilling 2009). Employing processes similar to that 
adopted in this study will provide a reliable alternative to current approaches.  
Second, my approach in identifying an exogenous technological 
discontinuity and using it for a natural quasi-experiment contributes to the 
empirical aspects of evolution of alliances at different levels of analysis. Ahuja 
et al. (2012, p. 446) called for such a methodology acknowledging that “using 
exogenous shocks to identify effects is a promising arena, but finding data 
context with clear and usable exogenous shocks will remain a challenge.” 
Beyond its intended theoretical and empirical contributions, this thesis 
has several implications for the literature. First, the findings signify the value 
of evaluating changes in the value of resources from an evolutionary 
economics perspective rather than an ecological point of view (Lavie 2006). 
The framework proposed by Anderson and Tushman (1990) employs an 
ecological perspective, that  technological discontinuities either destroy the 
bulk of a firm’s resources or significantly increase their value, thereby 
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challenging the existence of the firm. Applying an evolutionary economics 
lens (Nelson and Winter 1982), the effects of the technological discontinuity 
in this study rest between the extremes of competence-enhancing and 
competence-destroying. Therefore, while part of firm’s resources is 
challenged, it does not lose its entire value and application in value creation. 
At the same time, certain resources are reinforced following the discontinuity 
while others are unaffected. Finally, technological discontinuities may 
introduce new resources whose value was unknown to the firms before the 
discontinuity. Alliance portfolios are affected by technological discontinuities 
differently depending on the type of resources they transfer between focal 
firms and their portfolio partners. My thesis suggests that detailed evaluation 
of how discontinues increase or reduce the value of resources can prove 
insightful to the research on alliance portfolio reconfiguration and 
technological discontinuities.    
Second, the findings of the thesis have implication for research on the 
organizational design literature (Gulati and Singh 1998, Puranam et al. 2012). 
Research suggests that investment on inter-partner or inter-department 
communication and integration help agents coordinate their activities and 
manage their interdependencies in static environments where flexibility and 
agility are not particularly important (Tushman and Nadler 1978). The results 
of this essay show that interdependence between the focal firm and its 
portfolio partners may undermine its flexibility to respond through portfolio 
reconfiguration to the changing environmental conditions in the form of 
technological discontinuities. Therefore, my study implies that organizational 
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design in response to partners’ interdependence could have varying impacts on 
their responses across static and dynamic environments. 
Finally, the insights gained from this essay can be extended to address 
evolution of networks of alliances (Ahuja et al. 2012). Research on networks 
of alliances and their implications for firm’s innovation and performance has 
progressed significantly in recent years (Galaskiewicz 1985, Koka and 
Prescott 2008, McPherson et al. 1992, Soh 2010). However, these studies 
overlook the fact that networks’ structures are not static leading to the network 
benefits being temporary and unstable (Ahuja et al. 2012). Without an 
understanding of the genesis and evolutionary dynamics of networks, our 
understanding of their performance implication remains incomplete. 
Actions taken by network’s agents drive network evolution (Ahuja et 
al. 2012, Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009) because “network structures emerge as a 
result of self-seeking actions by focal nodes and their connections” (Ahuja et 
al. 2012, p.438). Therefore, alliance portfolio reconfigurations through 
formation of new ties and disbandment of current ties may be “the engines of 
network evolution” (Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009, p. 246). These implications 
can be used to construct agent-based and other simulation models to study 
different scenarios of actions taken by firm (i.e., agents) for better 
understanding of network evolution (Davis et al. 2007). 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this thesis I tried to investigate the underlying mechanism of change in 
alliance portfolios and establish a causal link between technological 
discontinuities, as major changes in the environment, and alliance portfolio 
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reconfiguration. The essays collectively expand the solution space for 
understanding the evolutionary processes of new forms of organizations when 
firms expand beyond their traditional boundaries (Gulati et al. 2012). 
However, these results also identify the need for further research to address 
limitations.  
First, future research should extend this study to industries with 
different resource requirements, which are affected by different forms of 
discontinuities, and where alliance portfolio characteristics may differ. 
Particularly, it would be interesting to see whether business model radical 
innovations have similar effects on firms’ resources and alliance portfolios 
(Gambardella and McGahan 2010). Business model innovations are perhaps 
harder to decipher and adapt to than scientific breakthroughs are because they 
are largely generated from juxtaposition of organizational routines and 
processes, and are often incongruent with the incumbents’ business processes 
(Markides 2012). Given the emerging interest on business model innovation 
and its underdeveloped academic literature (Markides 2013), establishing how 
business model discontinuities affect alliance portfolio reconfiguration will be 
of theoretical and practical importance. 
 Second, the measurement of interdependence could be improved. 
Thompson’s (1967) typology of interdependence may not capture the true 
nature of interdependence as it does not address the shared activities’ incentive 
structure—the way the agents’ actions are measure and rewarded (Puranam et 
al. 2012). Observing and measuring the structure of incentives in alliance 
portfolios is notoriously challenging, making it difficult to develop theoretical 
insights. Therefore, simulation and computational models may be used to 
122 
 
study different scenarios where alliance portfolio partners agree to different 
performance measurement rules and incentive structures (Davis et al. 2007). 
More direct and comprehensive measures of interdependence between 
portfolio firms may provide additional insights. 
 Finally, this thesis could also be extended to examine performance 
implications of alliance portfolio reconfiguration to contribute to the 
literatures on the impact of alliance portfolios on firm performance, and on 
firm performance following a technological discontinuity (e.g., Afuah 2001, 
Afuah and Utterback 1997, Mitchell and Singh 1993, Tripsas 1997).Though 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration is important for renewal of resource-bases, it 
is costly and disruptive to the focal firms. It would be helpful to establish the 





Table A.1 Categories of Resources Affected by the Technological Discontinuity in 1995 








1 Combinatorial Chemistry            
2 High-throughput Screening            
3  Device              
4  Drug Delivery - Liposomes              
5  Drug Delivery - Oral              
6  In-licensed Products              
7  Microarrays              
8  Microspheres              
9  Monoclonals - Conjugates              
10  Natural Product              
11  Peptides              
12  Rational Drug Design - 
Computational  
            
13  Rational Drug Design - 
Small Molecules  
            
14  Service Laboratory              
15  Small Molecules (Synthetics)             
Continued on the next page 
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Table A.1 continued 















16 Bioinformatics         
17 Resin Polymers          
18 Separations          
19 Adjuvant          
20 Carbohydrates          
21 Cell Therapy - Stem 
Cells/Factors 
         
22 Collagen matrix          
23 Diagnostics          
24 Drug Delivery - Sustained 
Release 
         
25 Drug Delivery - Transdermal          
26 Generics          
27 Hyaluronic acid          
28 Immunoassay          
29 Immunoglobulin          
30 Implantable Devices          
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Table A.1 Continued 








31 Micropropagation       
32 Monoclonals       
33 Monoclonals - Anti-Idiotypes       
34 Monoclonals - Humanized & 
Fully Human Abs 
      
35 Monoclonals - Transgenic 
mice 
      
36 Oligonucleotide ligands       
37 Oligonucleotides - 
Antisense/Triple helix 
      
38 Oligonucleotides - Gene 
Therapy 
      
39 Oligonucleotides - 
Ribozymes 
      
40 PFOB Emulsions       
41 Pharmacogenomics       
42 Phototherapy       
43 Polyclonal Antibodies       
44 Polyethylene glycol       
45 Proteomics       
Continued on the next page 
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Table A.1 continued 








46 Purines & Pyrimidines      
47 Transcription Factors      
48 Transgenics      
49 Vaccines      
50 DNA Probes     
51 Gene Expression     
52 Gene Sequencing     
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